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The recent subprime mortgage disaster exposed corporate officers
and directors who mismanaged their corporations, failed to exercise
proper oversight, and acted in their self-interest. Two previous waves
of corporate scandals in this decade revealed similar misconduct.
After the initial scandals, Congress and the Securities and Exchange
Commission attempted to prevent the next crisis in corporate
governance through legislative and regulatory actions such as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Those attempts failed. Shareholder
derivative litigation has also failed because judges accord corporate
executives great deference and thus rarely impose liability for
breaches of fiduciary duties.
To prevent the next crisis in corporate governance, the answer is not
to enact more laws but to change the enforcer of the current laws.
That enforcer already exists—the civil jury. Most states, however,
deny any right to jury trial for shareholder derivative litigation. In
these states, shareholders largely fail in their attempts to hold
corporate executives liable for breaching their fiduciary duties.
Extending a jury trial right to all states would reinvigorate
shareholder derivative litigation and offer a populist check against
corporate executives’ misconduct. This simple change would coerce
corporate executives to properly oversee their companies and fulfill
their fiduciary duties because they would know that their misconduct
would be adjudicated by a jury of average Americans—similar to their
shareholders. Empowering the civil jury would also help restore
shareholders’ trust in corporate management, which could rebuild
confidence in the stock markets.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University. This Article has benefited from
comments by participants at the Midwest Law and Economics Association’s Annual Meeting on
October 3, 2008 that was sponsored by the Searle Center on Law, Regulation and Economic Growth at
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Abbott for their excellent research assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent subprime mortgage crisis, credit meltdown, and stock
market collapse exposed mismanagement, oversight failures, and selfinterested transactions by directors and officers of numerous
corporations. These events alarmed shareholders, bond investors, and
the public as the entire economy suffered. Much of the financial
collapse was linked to the securitization of mortgages and related
products.
Corporate executives created and perpetuated such
instruments to benefit themselves through short-term transactions that
looked good on paper and increased stock prices, but they failed to
conduct due diligence and consider the risks to the long-term interests of
their corporations, shareholders, and employees. The current executive
compensation system, which rewards directors and officers for these
short-term moves, has evolved into a scheme for corporate executives to
enrich themselves while swindling shareholders.1
The corporate scandals brought to light by the current financial
turmoil are not the first of this decade. The first wave of scandals began
in 2001 at corporations such as Enron and WorldCom. These scandals
revealed corporate officers indulging in “greed-driven schemes and
other abuses,” while directors turned a blind eye so long as stock prices
continued to rise.2 Several years later, the second surge of scandals
involved directors and officers backdating their stock options to profit
themselves at the expense of shareholders. 3 All three waves of scandals
this decade share a common thread; all revealed directors and officers
acting in their self-interest and without proper regard for their
corporations, shareholders, and employees.
Congress responded to the initial scandals by enacting the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which imposed new requirements on the

1. See Op-Ed., With New Pay Rules, Bankers Get What They Deserve, USA TODAY, Feb. 5,
2009, at 12A.
2. E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and the Professional
Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 441–42 (2003) (noting that the Enron and WorldCom
scandals revealed that “(1) officers ran amok, wallowing in greed-driven schemes and other abuses; and
(2) directors allowed it to happen, tolerating officers who were managing to the market while they
contented the directors with ever-rising stock prices”).
3. See Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 918 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Stock options ‘backdating’
is a practice whereby a public company issues options on a particular date while falsely recording that
the options were issued on an earlier date when the company’s stock was trading at a lower price. The
options are purportedly issued with an exercise price equal to the market price on the date of the option
grant. But, in fact, because the grant dates were falsified, the options were ‘in the money’ when
granted.”); see also Charles Forelle & James Bandler, As Companies Probe Backdating, More Top
Officials Take a Fall, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2006, at A1 (discussing backdating scandals at, among other
companies, Apple Computer Inc., McAfee Inc., Monster Worldwide Inc., and Bed Bath & Beyond Inc.).
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officers and directors of publicly traded corporations.4 The Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) implemented SOX by adopting
numerous new regulations on corporations and corporate executives.5
Additionally, SOX required the New York Stock Exchange and
NASDAQ to impose new requirements on public companies.6
Shareholders also responded to the initial scandals by attempting to
influence corporate governance with nonbinding shareholder proposals
designed to prevent directors from entrenching themselves in their
positions or from promoting their own interests at the expense of
shareholders.7 Yet the scandals continued.
These new statutes and regulations failed to prevent future crises in
corporate governance. Litigation remains the primary remedy for
shareholders when corporate executives commit acts of mismanagement,
malfeasance, abuse, or abdicate their responsibility to oversee corporate
employees. Shareholder litigation, however, rarely succeeds in holding
corporate executives liable for breaching their fiduciary duties.
Shareholder derivative litigation often fails because judges have
historically protected directors and officers from liability for such
breaches. Rather than change the laws governing corporations again, a
change in the enforcer of the existing fiduciary duty laws is needed.
That enforcer already exists—the civil jury. Making civil juries the
enforcer would prevent the next crisis by reinvigorating shareholder
derivative litigation.
Most states deny any right to a jury trial in shareholder derivative
litigation. This is unfortunate because extending the right to a jury trial
to shareholder derivative litigation offers a populist check against
corporate executives and judges. Giving juries the power to hold
corporate executives liable for their actions will strike fear in the hearts
of corporate executives, who routinely avoid juries at all cost. Knowing
4. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1 & 7241 (2006).
5. See David Martin, Compliance Obligations under Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Related SEC
Regulations, BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP., June 2005, at 6 (summarizing the numerous SEC
regulations adopted in response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
6. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (forcing listing companies to impose more restrictive
requirements on public companies); NYSE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.02 (2004) (stating new,
more restrictive definition of director independence); NASDAQ STOCK MKT., INC., MARKETPLACE
RULES R. 4200(a)(15) (2004) (similar).
7. See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the
Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493, 527–28 (2005) (stating that
during the 2003 proxy season, shareholder proposals achieved majority votes on initiatives such as
eliminating staggered boards, separating the CEO position from the chairman of the board position,
limiting executive compensation, and eliminating poison pill defenses); see also Alistair Barr, Settlement
Fever Grips Companies as Proxy Season Looms, THOMSON FIN. NEWS, Mar. 4, 2006 (reporting in 2006
that more companies were settling with activist shareholders to avoid potentially damaging and
embarrassing proxy contests at annual meetings).
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they will be judged by a jury of American citizens similar to their
shareholders, corporate executives’ conduct may become more aligned
with the interests of shareholders than their own. Empowering juries
may help restore the confidence of shareholders, bond investors, and
stock markets.
After briefly explaining shareholder derivative litigation, Part II of
this Article summarizes the key events that contributed to the current
financial plight. Although Congress and the SEC have unsuccessfully
attempted legislative and regulatory responses to previous corporate
governance crises, the civil jury has not yet been fully utilized to check
corporate executives’ behavior. Part II next describes the current right
to a jury trial, and explains that most states do not allow any right to a
jury trial in shareholder derivative litigation because derivative litigation
has historically been considered equitable and civil juries have been
viewed negatively. Part III considers the negative views of the civil jury
and demonstrates such criticisms are undermined by empirical research
examining civil juries. Part IV then explains why juries are preferable to
judges. It examines the strong historical and democratic foundations of
the civil jury in the United States and explains the benefits of a civil jury
as the decisionmaker. Finally, Part V explains how to expand the right
to a jury trial in all shareholder derivative litigation. It also considers the
potential advantages and disadvantages, both theoretically and
normatively, of such an expansion and methods for improving civil
juries’ performance in derivative actions. The Article concludes that
expanding jury trials in shareholder derivative litigation may improve
corporate oversight by coercing directors and officers to fulfill their
fiduciary duties lest they be judged by a jury.
II. SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, AND
THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
An inherent tension exists between authority and accountability in
publicly held and large privately held corporations because of the
separation between management and ownership. Shareholders elect the
corporation’s board of directors8 and the law gives the board virtually
unlimited authority to manage the corporation.9 So if the shareholders
8. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b) & 212(b) (2009); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§§ 7.29 & 8.03(c) (2005).
9. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2009) (“The business and affairs of every
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”); MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2005) (“All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the
board of directors of the corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by
or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board of directors . . . .”).
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believe that the corporation’s directors are not acting in the corporation’s
best interests, they may theoretically hold those directors accountable by
electing new directors to the board.10 In reality, however, the existing
board nominates the slate of directors on which shareholders vote at the
shareholders’ annual meeting.11 Shareholders who want to nominate
their own slate of directors usually must mount a costly and difficult
proxy contest.12 Shareholders possess even less power on other matters,
because they have “no power to initiate corporate action” and have the
right to vote only on mergers, sales, dissolution, and amendments to the
corporate charter and bylaws.13 Consequently, when shareholders
believe directors and officers have mismanaged the corporation, failed to
exercise proper oversight, or acted in their self-interest, they commonly
resort to a shareholder derivative lawsuit.
A shareholder derivative lawsuit is filed by shareholders on behalf of
the corporation. In such lawsuits, the cause of action and any monetary
recovery belongs to the corporation because it was corporation that
Generally, the board of directors controls the
was injured.14
corporation’s litigation because it has the statutory authority to manage
the corporation and its assets.15 A shareholder may bring a derivative
action only after presenting the board with a demand, which is a request
that the board rectify the challenged decision.16 If the board rejects the
10. Cf. Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Democracy, Accountability and Global
Governance 3–4 (Harv. Univ. John F. Kennedy Sch. Gov’t, Politics Research Group, Working Paper
No. 01-4, 2001) (“Accountability can be created through actions ‘in the shadow of elections.’”).
11. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 83, 105–06 n.133 (2004).
12. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 9.5.4, at 394–96 (1986). However, the advent
of electronic proxy voting may make such proxy contests cheaper and easier. Lynn A. Stout, The
Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 807 n.47 (2007) (stating that electronic
proxy voting may “make it much cheaper and easier for dissenting shareholders to mount a proxy
battle”).
13. Bainbridge, supra note 11, at 105 (listing shareholder rights as “election of directors and
approval of charter or by-law amendments, mergers, sales of substantially all of the corporation’s assets,
and voluntary dissolution.” Id. at 105 n.133). Bainbridge also noted that “only electing directors and
amending the by-laws do not require board approval before shareholder action is possible.” Id. at 105
n.133 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109, 211 (2001)); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director
Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 569–72 (2003)
(discussing the weak control rights of shareholders).
14. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS § 8.2, at 362 (2002). A
shareholder may file a direct action if the cause of action belongs to the shareholder individually, for
example in claims involving oppression of minority shareholders. Id. § 8.2, at 362–63.
15. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2009) (“The business and affairs of every
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”); MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2005) (“All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the
board of directors of the corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by
or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board of directors . . . .”).
16. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1.
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demand, then the shareholder must demonstrate that the demand was
wrongfully rejected.17 In some states, the shareholder can forego
making a demand and argue that demand is excused, if the shareholder
can show that demand would be futile.18 To establish that demand
would be futile or that the board wrongfully rejected the demand, the
shareholder must typically show that a majority of directors either
participated in the challenged decision or are otherwise interested in the
challenged transaction.19 In other words, a trial court will permit a
shareholder derivative lawsuit to proceed only when the board of
directors is disabled by some conflict of interest. The law presumes that
directors will not agree to sue themselves in such circumstances.
Shareholder derivative litigation encompasses three primary
categories: (1) actions against directors to enjoin pending mergers or
sales, (2) actions against third parties seeking monetary recovery on
behalf of the corporation, and (3) actions against directors or officers
seeking monetary recovery for misconduct, malfeasance, abuse, or
failure of oversight. Because injunctive relief is always an equitable
decision for a judge, derivative actions in the first category are not the
focus of this Article.20 The derivative actions in the other two categories
seek monetary recovery for the corporation and would possess the right
to a jury trial if the corporation itself pursued the actions. This Article
focuses primarily on the third category because it is the category most
directly implicated by this decade’s corporate scandals.
Shareholder derivative litigation rarely succeeds in holding directors
liable for their decisions because such litigation faces many judicial
obstacles. A primary obstacle is the business judgment rule defense.
The Delaware Supreme Court, which is commonly followed by other
states on corporate law matters,21 articulates the business judgment rule
defense as a presumption that directors have acted consistent with their
fiduciary duties in making corporate decisions.22 This defense is based
17. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 14, § 8.5, at 395; see also Lisa Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the
Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 408
(2005) (stating that “although shareholders can challenge” directors’ rejection of a demand request,
“most courts defer to boards on this matter”).
18. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814–15 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm
v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
19. See id.; see also Beneville v. York, 769 A.2d 80, 85 n.9 (Del. Ch. 2000).
20. See infra Part II.B.
21. See, e.g., Mullen v. Acad. Life Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 971, 973 n.3 (8th Cir. 1983) (“[C]ourts of
other states commonly look to Delaware law . . . for aid in fashioning rules of corporate law.”); Andrew
D. Arons, In Defense of Defensive Devices: How Delaware Discouraged Preventive Measures in
Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 105, 130 (2004) (“[M]ost states look towards
Delaware’s corporate law decisions for guidance in their own holdings . . . .”).
22. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner (In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 27, 52
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on the justification that the board of directors is vested with the statutory
authority to manage the corporation.23 Defendants in derivative actions
can invoke the business judgment rule defense at multiple points during
litigation—including in pretrial motions for dismissal or summary
judgment, and even at trial.24 Consequently, the judge possesses a great
deal of power to end shareholder derivative litigation in favor of
defendants. Indeed, judges invoke the business judgment rule defense to
protect boards of directors from legal liability in the vast majority of
such cases.25
In response to the initial corporate scandals of this decade, Delaware
courts began to more narrowly interpret and apply the business judgment
rule defense,26 which may lead to more shareholder derivative actions
surviving until trial. Like Delaware, however, in many states even if a
shareholder derivative action reaches trial no right to a jury trial exists.
For instance, in one of the highest profile cases of this decade, In re The
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, the plaintiffs survived multiple
pretrial motions only to lose at trial.27 After a lengthy trial, the trial
judge ruled that the business judgment rule defense protected the Disney
directors’ decisions, despite finding that the directors’ conduct fell
“short of what shareholders expect and demand from those entrusted
with a fiduciary position” and that their conduct “does not comport with
(Del. 2006); McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916–17 (Del. 2000).
23. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003) (“The business
judgment rule, as a standard of judicial review, is a common-law recognition of the statutory authority to
manage a corporation that is vested in the board of directors.”); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,
872 (Del. 1985) (stating the business judgment rule “protect[s] and promote[s] the full and free exercise
of the managerial power granted to Delaware directors”), superseded by statute as stated in Emerald
Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001).
24. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005) (holding
after a lengthy trial, that the defendants were entitled to business judgment rule protection), aff’d, 906
A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); In re BHC Commc’ns, Inc. S’holder Litig., 789 A.2d 1, 4 (Del. Ch. 2001) (“[I]t is
a bedrock principle of Delaware corporate law that, where a claim for breach of fiduciary duty fails to
contain allegations of fact that, if true, would rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule, that
claim should ordinarily be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).”); Weinberger v. United Fin. Corp. of Cal.,
Civ. A. No. 5915, 1983 WL 20290, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1983) (noting that to defeat a summary
judgment motion, a plaintiff can “allude to facts in the record which are undisputed or which are
disputed but, if true, are sufficient to rebut the presumption” of the business judgment rule).
25. See Fairfax, supra note 17, at 409 (“[T]he tremendous deference courts grant to board
decisions means that courts hold directors liable for only the most egregious examples of director
misconduct.”); see also TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A
CROSSROAD 183–84 (2006) (noting “the historical strong protection of corporate boards”).
26. See Ann M. Scarlett, Confusion and Unpredictability in Shareholder Derivative Litigation:
The Delaware Courts' Response to Recent Corporate Scandals, 60 FLA. L. REV. 589 (2008).
27. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 278 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re
The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. Civ. A. 15452, 2004 WL 2050138, at *8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10,
2004). The trial occurred between October 2004 and January 2005. In re The Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 697.
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how fiduciaries of Delaware corporations are expected to act.”28 Thus,
in the end, the Disney plaintiffs’ fate was the same as always—defeated
by a judge’s decision to protect directors from liability for their
misconduct.
As described in the next subpart, the recent financial collapse has
revealed corporate scandals that are generating shareholder derivative
litigation—similar to the prior scandals of this decade. If such litigation
is filed in states which, like Delaware, do not permit jury trials, then it
may meet the same fate as the Disney case.
A. Subprime Mortgage Crisis, Credit Crunch, and Stock Market
Collapse
The compensation system for corporate executives contributed to the
subprime mortgage crisis, credit crunch, and stock market collapse.
Corporate executives often receive bonuses based not on their
performance, “but on risky, short-term moves that look good on paper
and pump up stock prices.”29 Corporations created this bonus system to
attract high quality officers and directors:
In theory, the chance at a fat bonus attracts top-flight financiers and
motivates them to work hard. But by pegging bonuses to short-term
returns, with no provisions for clawing back those bonuses if profits turn
to losses, Wall Street devised a way to reward itself for taking great risk,
exposing everyone else to danger. This is not only unfair to shareholders
and taxpayers, it also undermined the economy.30

By rewarding directors and officers for short-term profits, the current
executive compensation system has become a means by which corporate
executives enrich themselves while swindling shareholders.
For instance, the scandals within the recent financial collapse
originated with Wall Street investment banks bundling trillions of
dollars worth of mortgages into various forms of mortgage-backed

28. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 763; see id. at 697 (finding that the
Disney directors did not comply with “best practices of ideal corporate governance”).
29. Editorial, Scraping by on Half a Mil, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 6, 2009, at A14; see also Andrew
Ross Sorkin, Putting a Value on a C.E.O., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2008, at B1 (“What has caused the most
outrage is the difference between pay and actual performance . . . .”); David Greising, Tide Seems to be
Turning on Big Corporate Paydays, CHI. TRIBUNE, Feb. 6, 2009, at C27 (“Never before has Wall
Street’s star system seemed so tarnished. Merrill Lynch’s John Thain gets a package worth up to $87
million in 2007, and what happens next? A shotgun merger with Bank of America late last year,
arranged to avert an outright collapse. Goldman Sachs’ Lloyd Blankfein nabs $69 million in 2007, and,
before you know it, he needs Warren Buffett to bail out his firm with a $5 billion rescue package.”).
30. Op-Ed., With New Pay Rules, Bankers Get What They Deserve, supra note 1, at 12A.
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securities, mortgage-backed bonds, and collateralized debt obligations.31
Wall Street investment banks then sold those products to investors,32
which helped fuel the surge in housing sales.33 In creating these
mortgage-backed securities, however, Wall Street firms relied on
mathematical risk models that falsely suggested such securities were
safe.34 They also failed to conduct due diligence on individual
mortgages within such securities,35 which would have revealed that
subprime borrowers’ mortgages were lumped together with the
mortgages of prime borrowers who had good credit histories.36
The massive number of mortgage securitizations is viewed “as a key
culprit of the housing mess because banks created and then sold billions
of dollars of securities without conducting due diligence on individual
loans within the pools.”37 While the financial markets soared, “the
incentives on Wall Street were to keep chasing profits by trading more
and more sophisticated securities, piling on more debt and making larger
and larger bets.”38 But this scheme was unsustainable. When home
prices began falling, widespread fears of mortgage defaults (particularly
defaults on subprime mortgages) crushed the values of these mortgage-

31. The securitizations of mortgages took several forms including mortgage-backed securities,
mortgage-backed bonds, and collateralized debt obligations. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s
Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1109, 1111–13 (explaining the
securitization process and the nomenclature of the mortgage-backed products); see also Jennifer E.
Bethel et al., Legal and Economic Issues in Litigation Arising from the 2007-2008 Credit Crisis (Harv.
Law & Econ. Discussion Paper No. 612, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1096582&rec=1&srcabs=956243 (same); Confessions of a Risk Manager, THE
ECONOMIST, Aug. 7, 2008, at 72 (noting that a collateralized debt obligation is a package of assetbacked securities). All of these products are included within this Article’s interchangeable references to
“mortgage-backed securities” and “mortgage securitizations.”
32. Ruth Simon, Investors Hit BofA Loan Modification, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 2008, at C1.
33. Liz Rappaport & Carrick Mollenkamp, Banks May Keep Skin in the Game, WALL ST. J., Feb.
10, 2009, at C3.
34. See Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 1114–15; see also Kristopher Geradi et al., Brookings
Institute, Making Sense of the Subprime Crisis (Sept. 5, 2008) (draft Brookings Paper on Economic
Activity),
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/economics/bpea/~/media/Files/Programs/
ES/BPEA/2008_fall_bpea_papers/2008_fall_bpea_gerardi_sherlund_lehnert_willen.pdf (arguing that
Wall Street correctly predicted the drop in the real estate prices but assigned too low of a probability to
that risk); Uday Rajan et al., The Failure of Models that Predict Failure: Distance, Incentives and
Defaults (Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 08-19, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1296982 (arguing that the quantitative methods used
by Wall Street underestimated defaults for subprime borrowers).
35. Rappaport & Mollenkamp, supra note 33, at C3; see also Ruptured Credit, THE ECONOMIST,
May 17, 2008, at 6, 8 (explaining how the proliferation and complexity of these instruments “made it
even harder to understand the composition and quality of underlying assets”).
36. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1313, 1316–18
(2009).
37. Rappaport & Mollenkamp, supra note 33, at C3.
38. Steve Lohr, Wall Street’s Extreme Sport, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at B1.
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backed securities, which then collapsed the markets for such securities.39
A Wall Street Journal article observed that “[t]he financial crisis has
created losers across the spectrum—homeowners who can’t afford their
subprime mortgages, banks that loaned to them, investors who bought
mortgage-backed securities and, as financial markets eventually
crumbled, just about everyone who owned shares.”40 The steep decline
of the financial markets alone impacted the approximately 6 in 10
Americans who have money invested in the stock market.41 Hence, the
actions of the officers and directors of the corporations in this mortgage
securitization chain severely harmed the long-term interests of their
corporations, shareholders, and employees, while they received record
compensation for their short-term actions.
The consequences did not end there, however, because Wall Street
investment banks’ actions led to the credit crunch. Banks “hobbled by
these bad investments [in subprime mortgage-backed securities] reined
in lending, spawning the wider credit crunch as a result.”42 Even small
banks have failed as result and regulators expect more bank failures as
bad real-estate loans continue to damage bank balance sheets.43 Some
economists predict that “banks with huge holdings in subprime
mortgages and related securities . . . may never recover much of their
value.”44 Economists also worry about the future of securitization,
which is a pivotal instrument of modern banking that allows banks to
bundle all sorts of loans into securities for sale to investors, and thus
plays a significant role in the credit markets driving the American

39. Alan S. Blinder, Missing the Target with $700 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, at BU4.
40. Tom Lauricella, The Stock Picker’s Defeat, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2008, at A1; see also
Susanne Craig et al., The Weekend that Wall Street Died, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2008, at A1 (“For the
U.S. Securities industry to unravel as spectacularly as it did in September, many parties had to pull on
many threads. Mortgage bankers gave loans to Americans for homes they couldn’t afford. Investment
houses packaged these loans into complex instruments whose risk they didn’t always understand.
Ratings agencies often gave their seal of approval, investors borrowed heavily to buy, regulators missed
the warning signs. But at the center of it all—and paid hundreds of millions of dollars during the boom
to manage their firms’ risk—were the four bosses of Wall Street.”).
41. Public Agenda, http://www.publicagenda.org/charts/six-10-americans-say-they-have-moneyinvested-stock-market-nearly-half-say-stock-market-has-no-affect (last visited Jan. 14, 2010); see also
INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2008 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS
AND
ACTIVITY IN THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 7 (2008), available at
http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2008_factbook.pdf (stating that about 90 million Americans are invested
in the stock market).
42. Robin Sidel, Massive Efforts to Save Mortgages, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2008, at A1.
43. Dan Fitzpatrick & Damian Paletta, Three Banks Fail in a Single Day, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24,
2008, at C2.
44. Ben White, Goldman Sachs Reports a $2.1 Billion Quarterly Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2008, at B4.
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economy.45 Economists note that “[t]hree decades ago, banks supplied
$3 out of every $4 worth of credit worldwide. Today, because of
securitization, that share has dropped to about $1 in $3.”46
The mortgage-backed securities created by Wall Street investment
banks also led to the creation of credit-default swaps, in which investors
swapped contracts that insured pools of mortgage-backed securities.47
Insurance companies, such as American International Group, Inc. (AIG),
began selling insurance on debt securities backed by subprime
mortgages; such insurance promised buyers “that if the debt securities
defaulted, AIG would make good on them.”48 Essentially, AIG insured
security trading parties, including parties trading mortgage-backed
securities, against any losses in their holdings of securities backed by
pools of mortgages and other assets.49 AIG’s financial-product unit
operated more like “a Wall Street trading firm than a conservative
insurer selling protection against defaults on seemingly low-risk
securities.”50 The face value of the entire credit-default swap market
was an estimated $55 trillion and, although intended to spread risk, these
credit-default swaps actually magnified the financial collapse.51 The
federal government has twice bailed out AIG because of its enormous
losses from the mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt
obligations that it insured.52
45. See Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, supra note 36, at 1313–15 (explaining the
importance of securitization).
46. Eric Dash & Vikas Bajaj, Parched for Credit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2008, at B1
(“Securitization, which works like a shadow banking system, has radically changed banking and the
credit markets in recent years.”); see also Rappaport & Mollenkamp, supra note 33, at C3 (“The $8.7
trillion securitization market, which also helped fund credit cards and auto loans, is largely dead . . . .”).
47. Lohr, supra note 38, at B1. A swap occurs between two investors (typically banks or hedge
funds) and is not traded on an exchange. Id. Credit-default swaps were originally created to insure
blue-chip bond investors against the risk of default. Id.
48. Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Behind AIG’s Fall, Risk Models Failed to Pass Real-World Test,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2008, at A1.
49. Serena Ng et al., AIG Faces $10 Billion in Losses on Bad Bets, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2008,
at C1; see also Matthew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central
Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A1 (“AIG was a major seller of
‘credit-default swaps,’ essentially insurance against default on assets tied to corporate debt and mortgage
securities.”).
50. Ng et al., supra note 49, at C1.
51. Lohr, supra note 38, at B1 (stating that credit-default swaps “magnified the financial crisis
because the market is unregulated, obscure and brimming with counterparty risk”); Heard on the Street /
Financial Analysis and Commentary, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 15, 2008, at C8 (stating that AIG’s residential
portfolio has a face value of at least $88 billion).
52. See Michael J. de la Merced & Sharon Otterman, A.I.G. Takes Its Session in Hot Seat, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, at B1; see also Matthew Karnitschnig et al., AIG Faces Cash Crisis as Stock Dives
61%, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, at A1 (“AIG’s business selling credit protection against the
possibility of default in a variety of assets, including subprime mortgages, set it apart from most other
insurers and tied it more closely to the fate of the housing and credit markets.”); Annelena Lobb, Few
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Numerous instances of mismanagement and looting by corporate
executives were uncovered as the dominoes fell during the recent
financial collapse, and they are already generating litigation.53 Citigroup
shareholders have filed a derivative action in federal court in the
Southern District of New York, alleging that Citigroup executives
recklessly purchased billions of dollars in subprime loans for
securitization despite the apparent subprime mortgage crisis.54 A similar
action is pending against Citigroup in the Delaware Chancery Court.55
AIG shareholders have also filed a similar derivative action in the
Delaware Chancery Court.56 Shareholders in Merrill Lynch have also
filed a derivative action attempting to recoup the monetary losses
suffered by the corporation from its aggressive investment in
collateralized debt obligations and mortgage-backed securities, but their
case was dismissed because the shareholders lacked standing following
Bank of America’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch.57 Now virtually
identical actions are pending against Bank of America in both the
Delaware Chancery Court and the federal court in the Southern District
of New York.58 As the next section demonstrates, the plaintiffs in the
derivative actions pending in federal court will possess a right to jury
trial, but the other litigants will not because Delaware, like most states,
Bright Lights Amid the Gloom, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2009, at R2 (stating that AIG’s billions of dollars in
losses stemmed “mainly from problems in a unit that sold a form of insurance against credit defaults”).
53. Numerous class actions alleging securities fraud have also been filed. See CORNERSTONE
RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2008 A YEAR IN REVIEW 4 (2009),
http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/YIR2008.pdf (stating that 210 federal securities class actions were
filed in 2008 and that 90% of the class actions filed against financial companies were related to the
subprime mortgage crisis); Bethel et al., supra note 31, at 2. These actions possess a right to jury trial,
and thus are not discussed in this article.
54. Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Waste of
Corporate Assets, Unjust Enrichment and Violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Nathanson
v. Prince, No. 107CV10333, 2007 WL 5042954 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2007).
55. Consolidated Second Amended Derivative Complaint, In re Citigroup, Inc. S’holder
Derivative Litig., No. 3338-CC, 2008 WL 3910741 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2008).
56. Verified Double Derivative Complaint, Fulco v. Cassano, No. 4290, 2009 WL 111395 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 15, 2009).
57. In re Merrill Lynch & Co., 597 F.Supp. 2d 427, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (dismissing derivative
actions on grounds that under Delaware law shareholders lacked standing to bring derivative suits on
behalf of Merrill Lynch because they no longer owned stock in Merrill Lynch after its merger with Bank
of America in a stock-for-stock transaction).
58. Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint, Siegel v. Lewis, No. 09 CV 1331, 2009 WL
455225 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2009); Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint, Hollywood Police
Officers Ret. Sys. v. Lewis, No. '09 CV 01174, 2009 WL 365121 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 09, 2009); Verified
Class and Derivative Action Complaint, Houx v. Lewis, No. 4389, 2009 WL 497059 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23,
2009); Verified Derivative Complaint, Kovacs v. Lewis, No. 4356-VCS, 2009 WL 357482 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 10, 2009); Verified Derivative Complaint, Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Lewis, No. 4310, 2009 WL
207904 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2009); Derivative Complaint, Rothbaum v. Lewis, No. 4307, 2009 WL
166390 (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2009).
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denies any right to a jury trial for shareholder derivative actions.
B. The Right to a Jury Trial in Shareholder Derivative Litigation
Shareholders pursuing a derivative action have a number of
considerations in choosing a forum in which to file their action.
Shareholders can always bring a derivative action in the state in which
the corporation is incorporated. They can also file in any state in which
the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction. Thus shareholders
can file a derivative claim on behalf of many large public corporations in
numerous states. Shareholders may also file derivative actions in federal
court if the claim is based on a federal question59 or if diversity
jurisdiction exists,60 which requires that all plaintiff-shareholders be
citizens of states other than the home states of the defendants.61 Each
potential forum offers different perceived advantages and disadvantages.
In some forums, one of the advantages is the right to a jury trial.
1. The Law of the Forum Court Governs the Right to Jury Trial
The law of the forum where the shareholder derivative lawsuit is filed
determines whether a right to a jury trial exists. When a lawsuit is filed
in federal court under either federal question jurisdiction or diversity
jurisdiction, the federal court applies its own rules of practice and
procedure.62 Thus, regardless of the substantive law that will govern the
merits of the case, a federal court will apply federal provisions to decide
whether a right to a jury trial exists in a lawsuit.63 Similarly, in state
courts, the law of the forum state governs the conduct of the court
proceedings and the rules of practice.64 The weight of judicial authority
holds that the method of trying a case, including whether there is a right
to a jury trial, is a matter of procedure.65 Thus, regardless of which
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
60. Id. § 1332(a).
61. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553–54 (2005) (“The
complete diversity requirement is not mandated by the Constitution, or by the plain text of § 1332(a).
The Court, nonetheless, has adhered to the complete diversity rule in light of the purpose of the diversity
requirement, which is to provide a federal forum for important disputes where state courts might favor,
or be perceived as favoring, home-state litigants. The presence of parties from the same State on both
sides of a case dispels this concern, eliminating a principal reason for conferring § 1332 jurisdiction over
any of the claims in the action.”) (citation omitted).
62. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
63. Gatenby v. Altoona Aviation Corp., 259 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
64. See 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conflicts of Law § 148 (1998); Jaeger v. Jaeger, 53 N.W.2d 740 (Wis.
1952).
65. ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 122, at 242 (3d ed. 1977).
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state’s substantive law applies66 and whether a shareholder would be
entitled to a jury trial in federal court, a state court may not recognize a
right to a jury trial.67
This view is consistent with the First and Second Restatements of
Conflicts. The First Restatement of Conflicts states that “[t]he law of the
forum governs all matters of pleading and the conduct of proceedings in
court”68 and that “[t]he law of the forum determines whether an issue of
fact shall be tried by the court or by a jury.”69 Similarly, the Second
Restatement of Conflicts states that “[t]he local law of the forum governs
rules of pleading and the conduct of proceedings in court”70 and
specifically that “[t]he local law of the forum determines whether an
issue shall be tried by the court or by a jury.”71 Thus, the forum state
may apply its own procedural rules to decide whether a shareholder
derivative action has a right to a jury trial.
Other procedural rules of the forum court will also apply in
shareholder derivative lawsuits. For instance, many states and the
federal courts have enacted special pleading standards for derivative
actions, which require the plaintiffs to plead either that they made a
demand on the board of directors or the reasons why such a demand is
excused.72 Although the forum court’s procedural rules apply, the
substantive law of the corporation’s state of incorporation applies to the
merits pursuant to the internal affairs doctrine adopted by every state.73
66. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988); Vanier v. Ponsoldt, 833 P.2d
949, 961 (Kan. 1992).
67. Rankin v. Frebank Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 75, 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
68. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 592 (1934).
69. Id. § 594.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 127 (1971).
71. Id. § 129.
72. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1.
73. Shareholder derivative suits challenge the directors’ decisions, and thus involve judicial
review of the corporation’s internal affairs. All states have recognized the “internal affairs doctrine,”
which provides that the law of the state where the corporation is incorporated governs the internal affairs
of the corporation. See VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1113
(Del. 2005) (stating that under the internal affairs doctrine, state law governs those matters “that pertain
to the relationships among or between the corporation and its officers, directors, and shareholders”); see
also First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 621 (1983) (“As a
general matter, the law of the state of incorporation normally determines issues relating to the internal
affairs of a corporation. Application of that body of law achieves the need for certainty and
predictability of result while generally protecting the justified expectations of parties with interests in the
corporation. . . . Different conflicts principles apply, however, where the rights of third parties external
to the corporation are at issue.”); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (“The internal affairs
doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only one State should have the authority to
regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the
corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders—because otherwise a corporation could
be faced with conflicting demands.”).
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2. The Right to Jury Trial in Federal Courts
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Seventh Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution as protecting the jury trial rights that existed when that
amendment was adopted in 1791. The Seventh Amendment states that
“[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”74 The
colonial courts formed before the American Revolution were patterned
on the English judicial system, which had two court systems: courts of
common law and courts of chancery. In the common law courts, a jury
trial was widely available for most of the legal claims commonly in use
by the eighteenth century. In the chancery courts, the chancellor
administered a variety of equitable remedies without a jury. The framers
of the Seventh Amendment struck a compromise that preserved the right
of trial by jury for those cases that were historically brought in the courts
of common law.75 The Seventh Amendment did not extend any right to
jury trial to those cases that were historically relegated to the courts of
chancery. In other words, a right of trial by jury exists for the legal
claims historically pursued in the common law courts, but not for the
equitable claims historically pursued in the chancery courts.
Consistent with the language of the Seventh Amendment, the
Supreme Court has adopted a historical test for determining whether a
right to a jury trial exists in a particular case that analyzes whether the
particular claim would have been within the jurisdiction of the common
law courts of 1791 when the Seventh Amendment was adopted.76 For
most claims, well-established historical patterns easily solve the
question of the right to trial by jury. Claims created after 1791, such as
those created by statute, are more complicated. For such claims, the
Supreme Court requires federal courts to examine the nature of the
claims and remedies sought: “First, we compare the statutory action to
18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger
of the courts of law and equity. Second, we examine the remedy sought
and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature.”77 The Supreme
74. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial was incorporated into
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment
to the Constitution—or as provided by a federal statute—is preserved to the parties inviolate.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 38(a).
75. See generally HEBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR: THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE OPPONENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION 18–19 (1981) (discussing the adoption
of the Seventh Amendment); Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh
Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 668–705 (1973) (same).
76. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564–65 (1990); see
also DePinto v. Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826, 834 (9th Cir. 1963).
77. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417–18 (1987) (citations omitted).
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Court has stated that the second inquiry is more important in
determining whether a right to trial by jury exists.78
When the Seventh Amendment was adopted in 1791, the chancery
courts heard the claims of plaintiffs seeking injunctive or other relief
available only in equity.79 The chancery courts also heard the claims of
plaintiffs who wanted to use a procedural device available only in
equity, such as a derivative or class action.80 Because courts of common
law in 1791 did not allow shareholders to sue on behalf of the
corporation, shareholders were forced to turn to the chancery courts to
pursue a derivative suit “to enforce a corporate cause of action against
officers, directors, and third parties.”81 Consequently, shareholder
derivative actions were historically equitable, regardless of whether the
claims asserted in the actions were legal or equitable.82
In the 1970 Ross v. Bernhard decision, the U. S. Supreme Court
reversed a Second Circuit decision that had held that the Seventh
Amendment’s right to a jury trial did not extend to shareholder
derivative actions.83 The Supreme Court interpreted the Seventh
Amendment’s preservation of the right to a jury trial as including “not
merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old and
settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained
and determined” and thus that the Seventh Amendment “embrace[d] all
suits, which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may
be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal rights.”84
The Supreme Court noted that despite the difficulty defining the line
between actions in law and equity, some actions were clearly at law:
Whether the corporation was viewed as an entity separate from its
stockholders or as a device permitting its stockholders to carry on their
business and to sue and be sued, a corporation’s suit to enforce a legal
right was an action at common law carrying the right to jury trial at the
time the Seventh Amendment was adopted.85

In 1791, shareholder derivative suits were required to show that the
corporation had a valid claim but refused to sue after the shareholders
78. Chauffeurs, 494 U.S. at 565; Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 47–48 (1989).
79. See 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2302 (3d ed. 1998).
80. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 541 (1970) (noting that “the derivative suit and the class
action were both ways of allowing parties to be heard in equity who could not speak at law.”).
81. Id. at 534.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 532.
84. Id. at 533 (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove & Robeson, 28 U.S (3 Pet.) 433, 447
(1830)).
85. Id. at 533–34 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *475).
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made a suitable demand.86 The Supreme Court thus interpreted these
two preconditions as forming the:
dual aspects [of the derivative suit]: first, the stockholder’s right to sue on
behalf of the corporation, historically an equitable matter; second, the
claim of the corporation against directors or third parties on which, if the
corporation had sued and the claim presented legal issues, the company
could demand a jury trial.87

The Court then explained that:
[L]egal claims are not magically converted into equitable issues by their
presentation to a court of equity in a derivative suit. The claim pressed by
the stockholder against directors or third parties “is not his own but the
corporation’s.” . . . The proceeds of the action belong to the corporation
and it is bound by the result of the suit. The heart of the action is the
corporate claim. If it presents a legal issue, one entitling the corporation
to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, the right to a jury is not
forfeited merely because the stockholder’s right to sue must first be
adjudicated as an equitable issue triable to the court. 88

Thus, the Court held that the merger of law and equity meant that in a
shareholder’s derivative suit, the judge must preliminarily decide if the
shareholders’ derivative suit could proceed to trial, but a jury was
required to hear any legal claims asserted on behalf of the corporation.
The Supreme Court stated that this holding was required by its prior
decisions in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover89 and Dairy Queen, Inc.
v. Wood90 in which it had held that the right to a jury trial is preserved
even when legal and equitable claims are joined in the same case.91 In
such a case, “there is a right to jury trial on the legal claims which must
not be infringed either by trying the legal issues as incidental to the
equitable ones or by a court trial of a common issue existing between the
claims.”92 The Court thought the same principle determinative of the
question in derivative actions, because “[t]he Seventh Amendment
question depends on the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the
character of the overall action.”93 Thus, if the shareholder has a right to
sue on behalf of the corporation,94 the court examines the claim as if the
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id. at 538.
Id. at 538–39 (quoting Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522 (1947)).
359 U.S. 500 (1959).
369 U.S. 469 (1962).
Ross, 396 U.S. at 538.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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corporation was the entity asserting it.95 If the claim is one that
historically entitled the corporation to a jury trial, the shareholder
bringing the claim derivatively has a right to a jury trial.96
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) rejected
the historical distinction between law and equity and merged the two
such that one action may join all claims and remedies.97 The FRCP thus
destroyed “[p]urely procedural impediments to the presentation of any
issue by any party, based on the difference between law and equity.”98
Because law and equity are combined under the FRCP, “nothing turns
now upon the form of the action or the procedural devices by which the
parties happen to come before the court.”99 Thus, “it is no longer
tenable for a district court, administering both law and equity in the
same action, to deny legal remedies to a corporation, merely because the
corporation’s spokesmen are its shareholders rather than its
directors.”100
To support its conclusion that shareholder derivative actions
presenting legal claims possess a right to jury trial, the Supreme Court
noted that historically “the derivative suit and the class action were both
ways of allowing parties to be heard in equity who could not speak at
law,” but that a class action now may obtain a jury trial on any legal
claims asserted by the class.101 “After adoption of the rules there is no
longer any procedural obstacle to the assertion of legal rights before
juries, however the party may have acquired standing to assert those
rights.”102 The Supreme Court concluded that:
[g]iven the availability in a derivative action of both legal and equitable
remedies, we think the Seventh Amendment preserves to the parties in a
stockholder’s suit the same right to a jury trial that historically belonged
to the corporation and to those against whom the corporation pressed its
legal claims.103

95. Id.
96. Id. at 542.
97. Id. at 539. Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1, 2, and 18, the same court may try both
legal and equitable causes in the same action. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 508
(1959). “As pointed out in Beacon, legal and equitable issues can be tried at the same time, the jury (if
one has been demanded), rendering a verdict on the legal issues, and the court rendering a decision on
the equitable issues.” DePinto v. Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1963).
98. Ross, 396 U.S. at 539–40.
99. Id. at 540.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 541.
102. Id. at 542.
103. Id. But see id. at 550–51 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s decision was
not justified by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Constitution, but “can perhaps be explained
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In sum, the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment applies
to the traditionally equitable shareholder’s derivative suit when the
underlying claims present legal issues. For derivative actions filed in
federal court, the Supreme Court in Ross v. Bernhard held that “the right
to jury trial attaches to those issues in derivative actions as to which the
corporation, if it had been suing in its own right, would have been
entitled to a jury.”104 The right to a jury trial does not depend on the
character of the suit but on the nature of the issues involved within the
“ancient distinction between law and equity.”105
Courts look to the true basis of the action to distinguish between legal
and equitable claims.106 For example, federal courts allow a jury trial
when the claim alleges tortious misappropriation of trade information,107
conspiracy to defraud,108 fraudulent transactions,109 wrongful
appropriation,110 or where a claim for a breach of fiduciary duty is
predicated on underlying conduct such as negligence which, in a direct
suit, would allow a jury trial at common law.111 Even a claim that is
solely for breach of fiduciary duty carries a right to a jury trial when the
remedy sought is monetary damages.112 When a claim is equitable,
however, such as one seeking an injunction, courts do not allow a jury
trial. Thus, a plaintiff in a derivative action generally possesses a right
to a jury trial if the principal relief sought is a monetary judgment rather
than an equitable remedy.
Most circuit courts have concluded that the Supreme Court did not
announce a new procedural rule in Ross v. Bernhard, but rather resolved
a circuit conflict in articulating a rule consistent with the Supreme
Court’s prior interpretation of the procedure.113 A few circuit and
district courts, however, have ruled that highly complex cases such as
shareholder derivative suits are an exception to the Seventh
as a reflection of an unarticulated but apparently overpowering bias in favor of jury trials in civil
actions.”).
104. Id. at 532–33 (majority opinion). However, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
failure of a party to serve a demand for a jury trial constitutes a waiver of that right. FED. R. CIV. P.
38(b) & (d).
105. Fabrikant v. Bache & Co. (In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig.), 609 F.2d 411, 422 (9th Cir. 1979).
106. Id. at 423 (citing Ross, 396 U.S. 531); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
107. Bruce v. Bohanon, 436 F.2d 733, 736 (10th Cir. 1970).
108. Nat’l Union Elec. Corp. v. Wilson, 434 F.2d 986, 987–88 (6th Cir. 1970).
109. Halladay v. Verschoor, 381 F.2d 100, 109 (8th Cir. 1967).
110. Robine v. Ryan, 310 F.2d 797, 798 (2d Cir. 1962).
111. DePinto v. Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826, 836–37 (9th Cir. 1963).
112. In re Evangelist, 760 F.2d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 1985); Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 384 (1st
Cir. 1971); Tanzer v. Huffines, 314 F. Supp. 189, 196 (D. Del. 1970).
113. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 20–21 (7th Cir. 1972); see also DePinto, 323 F.2d
at 835–36 (creating a holding similar to Ross v. Bernhard).
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Amendment.114 These cases often argue that a footnote in Ross v.
Bernhard allows for such an exception to the Seventh Amendment.115
That footnote stated that “the ‘legal’ nature of an issue is determined by
considering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such
questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities
and limitations of juries.”116 Refusing to apply this rationale in rejecting
a jury claim, the Ninth Circuit determined that “[a]fter employing an
historical test for almost two hundred years, it is doubtful that the
Supreme Court would attempt to make such a radical departure from its
prior interpretation of a constitutional provision in a footnote.”117 Most
circuit courts have rejected the complexity exception to the Seventh
Amendment118 and the Supreme Court, in considering Seventh
Amendment questions since Ross v. Bernhard, has never considered
juries’ abilities in determining whether a right to trial by jury exists.119
3. The Right to Jury Trial in State Courts
The Supreme Court has held that the Seventh Amendment does not
apply to the states.120 Therefore, Ross v. Bernhard does not bind state
courts. Whether a shareholder derivative suit filed in state court has a
right to a jury trial depends on each state’s law.
A few states have adopted the Ross v. Bernhard approach or reached
the same approach based on interpretations of their own constitutions.121
For instance, New Mexico and Wyoming have explicitly adopted the
114. Cotton v. Witco Chem. Corp., 651 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1981); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp (In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig.), 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980); Kian v.
Mirro Aluminum Co., 88 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D.
59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Boise Cascade Secs. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976); see also
George K. Chamberlin, Complexity of Civil Actions as Affecting Seventh Amendment Right to Trial by
Jury, 54 A.L.R. FED. 733 (1981).
115. See Fabrikant v. Bache & Co. (In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig.), 609 F.2d 411, 425 (9th Cir. 1979);
see also Scott v. Woods, 730 P.2d 480 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
116. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970) (emphasis added) (citing Fleming James,
Jr., Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655 (1963)).
117. Fabrikant, 609 F.2d at 425.
118. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Fabrikant, 609 F.2d
411.
119. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363
(1974); Curtis v. Lothether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
120. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 220 (1916).
121. Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. The Business Judgment Rule:
Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587, 616 n.130 (1994); Jean E. Maess, Right to Jury Trial
in Shareholder’s Derivative Action, 32 A.L.R. 4th 1111 (2008); 13 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER,
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 5990.10 (2009); DEBORAH A. DEMOTT,
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 4:18 (2008).
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Ross v. Bernhard approach and allow jury trials where shareholder
derivative suits raise legal claims.122 New York also follows Ross v.
Bernhard, stating that if the claim is legal when brought by the
corporation, then there is a right to a jury trial because “legal claims are
not magically converted into equitable issues by their presentation to a
court of equity in a derivative suit.”123 Similarly, Alabama and
Maryland follow the Ross v. Bernhard approach in extending the right to
jury trial in shareholder derivative actions, but do so based on
interpretations of their own constitutions.124
By contrast, most states refuse to approach derivative suits like Ross
v. Bernhard and hold that no right to a jury trial exists in shareholder
derivative actions because such actions were historically filed in equity
courts which did not have jury trials.125 For instance, the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that its state constitution mandates that the “right of
jury trial shall be preserved only in those cases in which the parties were
entitled to it under the law or practice existing at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution” and thus no jury trial is allowed in shareholder
derivative suits.126 California courts have also rejected Ross v. Bernhard
and held that no right to a jury trial exists in derivative actions, declining
to depart from the “historically based approach” to interpreting their
state constitution.127 Although Florida courts have adopted a flexible
approach for deciding whether to allow jury trials in most cases, they
have declined to adopt Ross v. Bernhard and have relied on the
historically equitable nature of derivative action to deny any right to a
jury trial in shareholder derivative suits.128
Thus, even though these states have merged law and equity to allow
one lawsuit to present both legal and equitable claims, they continue to
deny any right to a jury trial for shareholder derivative actions. A few
states, however, have not merged law and equity.129 Delaware is the
122. Scott v. Woods, 730 P.2d 480, 486 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); Hyatt Bros., Inc. ex rel. Hyatt v.
Hyatt, 769 P.2d 329, 335 (Wyo. 1989).
123. Fedoryszyn v. Weiss, 310 N.Y.S.2d 55, 57 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970).
124. Fin., Inv. & Rediscount Co. v. Wells, 409 So. 2d 1341, 1344 (Ala. 1982); Hashem v. Taheri,
571 A.2d 837, 840 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990).
125. Maess, supra note 121; DEMOTT, supra note 121, § 4:18.
126. Pelfrey v. Bank of Greer, 244 S.E.2d 315, 316 (S.C. 1978).
127. Rankin v. Frebank Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 75, 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
128. Lanman Lithotech, Inc. v. Gurwitz, 478 So.2d 425, 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
129. Arkansas traditionally followed the historical analysis to deny a right to jury trial in
shareholder derivative actions. Hames v. Cravens, 966 S.W.2d 244, 246–48 (Ark. 1998) (holding that
the form of the action is dispositive and thus the equitable nature of a derivative suit excludes any right
to a jury trial). But such actions may now possess a right to a jury trial after Arkansas voters agreed to
merge the courts of law and equity in November 2000. See 2 DAVID NEWBERN & JOHN J. WATKINS,
ARKANSAS CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 29:3 (4th ed. 2009) (stating that law and equity are

148

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

most notable example because it is the state leader in corporate law.130
In Delaware, all shareholder derivative suits must be filed in the Court
of Chancery, which sits without juries.131
Iowa, on the other hand, denies jury trials in shareholder actions
because it would create “quite a quandary for the lower courts” to decide
which of the shareholders’ claims are legal or equitable under state
law.132 The Iowa Supreme Court also thought shareholder derivative
litigation too complicated for a jury to properly decide because such
cases typically involve multiple parties and require consideration of
complex issues such as fiduciary duties, the business judgment rule, and
the functioning of a large corporation.133 Likewise, it expressed
reservations about the fairness of a result in a jury trial due to the jury’s
lack of specialized knowledge and ability to evaluate the testimony.134
So to preserve the due process right to a fair trial, the Iowa Supreme
Court deemed judges better equipped to decide these complex claims.135
In sum, a few states allow jury trial of legal claims in shareholder
derivative actions consistent with the Ross v. Bernhard approach, but
most do not. Most states deny any right to a jury trial in shareholder
derivative actions because of the historically equitable nature of such
actions. Criticism and mistrust of juries has also played a role in the
decisions to prohibit any right to a jury trial in shareholder derivative
suits.

merged); Walker v. First Commercial Bank, 880 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Ark. 1994) (stating that procedural
rules will not be applied to diminish the right to a trial by jury); Charles D. McDaniel, Jr., First National
Bank of Dewitt v. Cruthis: An Analysis of the Right to a Jury Trial in Arkansas after the Merger of Law
and Equity, 60 ARK. L. REV. 563, 563 (2007).
130. See, e.g., Mullen v. Acad. Life Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 971, 973 n.3 (8th Cir. 1983) (“[C]ourts of
other states commonly look to Delaware law . . . for aid in fashioning rules of corporate law.”); Arons,
supra note 21, at 130 (“[M]ost states look towards Delaware’s corporate law decisions for guidance in
their own holdings . . . .”).
131. See Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950 (Del. 1992) , overruled on other grounds by
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); McMahon v. New Castle Assocs., 532 A.2d 601, 604 (Del.
Ch. 1987); Snyder v. Butcher & Co., C.A. No. 91C-04-0289, 1992 WL 240344 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept.
15, 1992).
132. Weltzin v. Nail, 618 N.W.2d 293, 300 (Iowa 2000); see also Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531,
550 (1970) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“[T]here are, for the most part, no such things as inherently ‘legal
issues’ or inherently ‘equitable issues.’ There are only factual issues, and, ‘like chameleons (they) take
their color from surrounding circumstances.’ Thus the Court’s ‘nature of the issue’ approach is hardly
meaningful.”).
133. Weltzin, 618 N.W.2d at 302.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 301.
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III. REFUTING THE CRITICISMS AGAINST CIVIL JURY TRIALS GENERALLY
Civil juries have long been criticized by lawyers, commentators, and
even judges. Such criticisms, however, were not systematically tested
until the past fifty years. Empirical research undermines much of the
criticisms of civil juries and jury trials. Subpart A summarizes the
typical criticisms directed toward civil juries and jury trials. Subpart B
then explains the empirical research that challenges such criticisms.
A. Criticisms of Civil Juries and Jury Trials
Criticizing juries and jury trials is not a new phenomenon. A
commentator in 1905 stated that the civil jury was a “clog upon
justice.”136 Noted American author Mark Twain once said: “The jury
system puts a ban upon intelligence and honesty, and a premium upon
ignorance, stupidity, and perjury. It is a shame that we must continue to
use a worthless system because it was good a thousand years ago.”137
Even judges have occasionally criticized juries. Chief Justice Warren
Burger opined that “civil juries waste time and often are incapable of
understanding issues presented to them.”138 More recently, Judge
Posner has questioned the ability of jurors, stating “I think it is
romanticizing . . . to suppose that average people are deep wells of
wisdom with a pumping station in every jury room.”139 Criticisms of
civil juries largely fall into two categories: (1) criticisms of civil juries’
performance and civil jury trials generally, and (2) criticisms of juries’
damage awards.
1. Criticisms of Civil Juries’ Performance and Civil Jury Trials
Generally
Critics often argue that jurors are ill-equipped for their
decisionmaking responsibilities. They describe juries as incompetent,
illogical, and irrational.140 Further, critics claim that juries are
136. Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accountability in the Litigation Process—The
Case for the Fact Verdict, 59 U. CINN. L. REV. 15, 17 (1990) (citing G. CLEMENTSON, SPECIAL
VERDICTS AND SPECIAL FINDINGS BY JURIES 9 (1905)).
137. 2 MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 76 (1913).
138. Brodin, supra note 136, at 18 (citing Suits Too Complex for a Jury, BUS. WEEK, Sept. 22,
1980, at 118); see also Warren E. Burger, Thinking the Unthinkable, 31 LOY. L. REV. 205, 210–11
(1985) (stating that juries are not comprised of peopled trained to decide complex litigation).
139. Richard A. Posner, Juries on Trial, 99 COMMENTARY 49, 51 (1995).
140. Brian H. Bornstein & Timothy R. Robicheaux, Crisis, What Crisis? Perception and Reality
in Civil Justice, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 2
(Brian H. Bornstein et al. eds., 2008); Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of
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“arbitrary, unpredictable, and subject to passion.”141 Similarly, they
argue that jurors are biased in favor of plaintiffs142 and tend to make
decisions based on experiences, stereotypes, and personal beliefs.143
Lawyers similarly criticize jury decisionmaking. When there is a
choice, parties often decide between a judge or jury trial based on the
lawyer’s attitude towards the jury. Stereotypical views may lead
lawyers to act unwisely in choosing between judge and jury trials.144
One corporate general counsel argued that a jury’s judgment is
frequently not based on the law and facts: “Oh, a plaintiff’s lawyer can
get [jurors] all riled up on emotion. It’s got nothing to do with law. It’s
got nothing to do with real liability. It’s got nothing to do with real
facts. It’s got to do with who’s the better actor.”145 Another lawyer
suggests that the “jury system is a bizarre lottery, lacking predictability
and consistency in who wins.”146 Other lawyers believe that jurors
“focus on something that is more akin to ‘L.A. Law’ than is true in a
courtroom context because that’s what they’ve been schooled in terms of
what a courtroom is.”147 However, “[d]espite the central importance of
lawyers’ perceptions of the jury to the civil litigation system, there is
little systematic information about their views.”148
Legal scholars have offered various arguments for reducing the role
of juries in civil litigation and some even urge the complete abolition of

Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 699 (2001) (contending
that jurors rarely pay complete attention and do not make decisions in the manner intended by courts,
regardless of how they are instructed).
141. CHARLES W. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 70 (1962); see also James E. Byrne,
Revised UCC Section 5-108(e): A Constitutional Nudge to Courts, 29 UCC L.J. 419 (1997); Stephen
Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric,
and Agenda-Building, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 269, 269 (1989); Valerie P. Hans, Attitudes Toward
the Civil Jury: A Crisis of Confidence?, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 248, 268–69
(Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Margaret L. Moses, The Jury-Trial Right in the UCC: On a Slippery Slope,
54 SMU L. REV. 561, 593–94 (2001).
142. Daniels, supra note 141, at 269; Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial:
A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 486, 506 (1975) (stating
that juror bias and incompetence are “very real problems”).
143. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119,
145 (2002) (“Lawyers entertain longstanding perceptions of juries as biased and incompetent, relative to
judges.”); see also JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 191 (Transaction Publishers 2009)
(1930) (“Proclaiming that we have a government of laws, we have, in jury cases, created a government
of often ignorant and prejudiced men.”).
144. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 143, at 144.
145. John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers’ and Executives’
Opinions, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 34 (1998) (alteration in original).
146. Daniels, supra note 141, at 280.
147. Lande, supra note 145, at 33.
148. Hans, supra note 141, at 274.
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civil juries.149 Scholars criticize jury trials as an inefficient use of
judicial resources.150 Some critics charge that jury trials cause court
congestion because “it takes time to select a jury, because lawyers spend
more time trying a case before a jury, and because it takes some time to
instruct the jury and for the jury to deliberate.”151 Commentators also
argue that jury trials take more time than bench trials.152 Some
commentators have gone so far as to contend that the failings of the civil
jury have created a crisis in the American legal system.153
Legal scholars and practicing attorneys highlight complex cases as the
area of most concern with civil juries. Indeed, “[s]ome of the most
vociferous criticisms of the jury relate to its performance in cases
involving business and corporate wrongdoing.”154 Some scholars
contend that juries are “less sympathetic to large business interests”155
and “less likely to understand complex issues.”156 The American Bar
Association, after observing alternate jurors in deliberations of complex
cases, noted that “many jurors were confused, misunderstood the
149. ELLEN E. SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVIL JURY 14–15 (2001); see also JEROME FRANK,
COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 124–25 (1949); Peter Huber, Junk
Science and the Jury, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 273, 302; Burger, supra note 138, 215–16; Steven D.
Penrod & Larry Heuer, Tweaking Commonsense: Assessing Aids to Jury Decision Making, 3 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 259, 259 (1997).
150. Moses, supra note 141, at 593–94; see also Jonathan D. Casper, Restructuring the
Traditional Civil Jury: The Effects of Changes in Composition and Procedures, in VERDICT: ASSESSING
THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 414, 417 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
151. JOINER, supra note 141, at 71.
152. Id.; Martin H. Redish & Daniel J. La Fave, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial in NonArticle III Proceedings: A Study in Dysfunctional Constitutional Theory, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
407, 410 n.15 (“It has been suggested on occasion that use of the civil jury trial adds significant timeconsuming burdens and expenses to the judicial process.”). In 1988, the National Center for State
Courts conducted a study of nine courts in three states and found that “jury trials last considerably
longer than nonjury trials.” DALE A. SIPES ET AL., NAT’L CTR FOR STATE COURTS, ON TRIAL: THE
LENGTH OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TRIALS 8–9 (1988) (reporting the median length for a civil jury was
thirteen hours thirty minutes, as opposed to four hours fifty-five minutes for a civil non-jury trial).
153. See Daniels, supra note 141, at 270, 277; see also Bornstein & Robicheaux, supra note 140,
at 1 (“There is clearly a perception that the civil justice system is, if not broken, in a serious state of
disrepair . . . and although the jury is not painted as the sole culprit, it is portrayed as a leading one.”);
Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors’ Treatment of Corporate Defendants, 48 DEPAUL
L. REV. 327, 327 (1998) (“Claims that the jury engages in undeservedly negative treatment of the
business corporation have been central to heated debate over the role of the jury and its place in an
alleged litigation crisis.”).
154. Valerie P. Hans, The Jury’s Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdoing, 52 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 177 (1989).
155. Moses, supra note 141, at 592; see also Sandra Schnitzer Stern, Revised Article 5 Brings
Uniformity, Predictability to Letters of Credit, 143 N.J. J.L., Feb. 26, 1996, at 803.
156. Moses, supra note 141, at 592; see also Casper, supra note 150, at 416–19, Hans, supra note
141, at 177 (“Critics question the jury’s fact-finding ability in cases with business and corporate parties,
and doubt whether lay jurors can understand the often complex and esoteric evidence of business
wrongdoing.”).
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instructions, failed to recall evidence, and suffered enormously from
boredom and frustration.”157
Corporate executives also want to avoid juries because the issues are
too complex for jurors to handle. One corporate executive stated: “Is it
any surprise that many commercial contracts these days have a clause
where each party waives its right to a trial by jury? Doesn’t that tell you
something? That they are not willing to trust twelve peers off the street
with the complexity of their business transaction.”158 Even corporate
attorneys avoid civil juries: “I started out as a plaintiff’s trial attorney
with a strong belief in the jury system . . . . I don’t believe that anymore.
I think the system is broken. I think it behooves you to do anything
possible to avoid it.”159 In one study, 75% of business executives, 73%
of inside counsel, and 60% of outside counsel believed that juries judge
businesses more harshly than individuals.160 In a 1992 Business Week
survey of 400 senior executives, 83% reported that “their decisions are
increasingly affected by the fear of lawsuits.”161 In that same survey,
85% of those executives blamed the high cost of litigation on
“[c]ontingency fees that enable people to sue without any financial risk”
and 79% blamed “[j]uries that hand out awards that are too high.”162 In
that same survey, 62% of executives also stated that “the U.S. civil
justice system significantly hampers the ability of U.S. companies to
compete with Japanese and European companies.”163
2. Criticisms of Juries’ Damage Awards
Lawyers frequently express discontent over juries’ damage awards.164
Critics argue that juries are “overgenerous in their verdicts.”165 Or, as
157. SPECIAL COMM. ON JURY COMPREHENSION, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, JURY COMPREHENSION
IN COMPLEX CASES 4 (1989).

158. Lande, supra note 145, at 34.
159. Id. at 32.
160. Id. at 34.
161. Mark N. Vamos, The Verdict from the Corner Office, BUS. WEEK, Apr. 13, 1992, at 66.
162. Id.; see also Archer W. Huneycutt & Elizabeth A. Wibker, Liability Crisis: Small Businesses
at Risk, 26 J. SM. BUS. MGMT, Jan. 1988, at 25, 25–28. In a study of 288 small business owners in
Louisiana, 68% “stated that they had made substantial changes in the way they operate their businesses
as a result of the liability crisis,” 69% stated that jury awards had little relationship to the actual injury,
and 58% stated that juries award damages based on sympathy rather than actual fault. Id. at 27.
163. Vamos, supra note 161, at 66.
164. JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 169 (1988) (“The thesis that juries are more
generous than judges is one of such long standing that it seems almost an article of faith in the legal
community and among the public. Documentation for it, however, is scant and ambiguous.”).
165. Daniels, supra note 141, at 269; Nancy S. Marder, The Medical Malpractice Debate: The
Jury as Scapegoat, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (2005) (stating that in the alleged medical
malpractice crisis, “the civil jury is often identified as the culprit” and accused of awarding “excessive
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one critics put it, “[t[he size of the award [is where] the jury has gone
nuts.”166 Similarly, some critics believe that juries are “more likely to
make awards based on the deep pocket of the defendant.”167 Other
critics contend that jury awards are more like lotteries. One lawyer
called the civil jury system “a bizarre lottery, lacking predictability and
consistency in who wins and how much winners are awarded.”168
Another attorney directly blamed sizeable lottery jackpots for everincreasing jury awards:
And I don’t know if anyone has done a statistical study, but I think that
the sheer [number of] zeros that come up in lotteries make it no longer
[unusual] for a jury to talk about $5 million, $10 million, $100 million,
maybe a billion dollars in some of their judgments. And [they] do it
without any relationship to what the damage was.169

Today, the prospect of unsympathetic jurors convinces many
corporations to settle170 or prefer litigation abroad.171 For instance, one
lawyer recounted a discussion with a business executive: “Look, the
odds we’re going to win this case are a toss-up. I mean we’re before a
California jury. It should be a $200,000 case, but it’s a California jury
so it could be $2 million. Or we can settle it for $300,000.” 172 The
business executive decided to settle.173
Legal historian Lawrence Friedman found that nineteenth-century
juries were accustomed to living with calamity, accepted it as part of
damages, particularly in frivolous lawsuits”); Dan Quayle, Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America,
60 U. CIN. L. REV. 979, 984 (1992) (criticizing juries for their punitive damages awards); Neil Vidmar,
The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849, 849
(1998) (“Juries have been said, variously, to be . . . excessively generous in awarding compensatory
damages, and out of control when awarding punitive damages.”).
166. Lande, supra note 145, at 33 (alteration in original).
167. Moses, supra note 141, at 592–93; see also Daniels, supra note 141, at 273; Lande, supra
note 145, at 34–35.
168. Daniels, supra note 141, at 280.
169. Lande, supra note 145, at 33–34 (alteration in original).
170. Karen Orren, Judicial Whipsaw: Interest Conflict, Corporate Business & the Seventh
Amendment, 18 POLITY 70, 85 (1985). The pressures and concerns forcing settlement in the shareholder
derivative context also appear in the class action context. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d
1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (Judge Posner stated that certification of a class action, even one lacking in
merit, forced defendants “to stake their companies on the outcome of a single jury trial, or be forced by
fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle even if they have no legal liability.”); see also HENRY J.
FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973) (calling class action settlements
induced by a small probability of an immense judgment “blackmail settlements”).
171. Arthur Anyuan Yuan, Enforcing and Collecting Money Judgments in China from a U.S.
Judgment Creditor’s Perspective, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 757, 780 (2004) (“Ironically, even U.S.
manufacturers, who are supposedly more receptive to the U.S. judicial system, prefer to litigate abroad,
partly because of their fear of generous jury awards of punitive damage at home.”).
172. Lande, supra note 145, at 21.
173. Id.
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life, and awarded damages accordingly.174 Contrastingly, he found that
twentieth-century juries desired total justice and expected fair treatment
and full compensation for undeserved suffering.175 Such desires, as well
as lawyers’ negative views of juries’ ability to rationally award
damages, may help explain the development of technical rules of
evidence governing damages issues.176 These evidentiary rules keep
juries from hearing evidence or argument regarding “information about
parties’ insurance coverage, treble damages in antitrust cases, attorneys’
fees, taxability of awards, settlement offers, and actual settlements
involving some of the parties.”177 These rules are “designed to blindfold
jurors, keeping from them information for fear that it might adversely
affect their decisionmaking process.”178
B. The Criticisms of Juries Are Not Supported by Empirical Research
Empirical research on juries undermines much of the criticism
discussed in the prior subpart. This research uses four primary
methodologies: (1) mock jury experiments involving simulated trials, (2)
post-deliberation interviews or surveys with ex-jurors, (3) analysis of
jury verdicts in archival sources, and (4) field studies or experiments
involving real juries. 179 The mock jury methodology has been used
most frequently.180 While there are a few isolated studies on juries
before World War II, systematic research on juries did not begin until
1953 with the Chicago Jury Project conducted by researchers at the
University of Chicago.181
1. Empirical Research Regarding Civil Juries Generally
The empirical research examining juries’ performance reveals a
different picture than the negative perceptions because it tends to show

174. Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial
Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 53 (1967).
175. Id.; cf. Stephan Landsman, The History and Objectives of the Civil Jury System, in VERDICT:
ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 22, 43 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) (stating that the backlash against
nineteenth century harsh tort doctrines “resulted in a renewed reliance on the [twentieth century] jury to
humanize the law, a trend that has continued to the present day”).
176. JOINER, supra note 141, at 75.
177. William W. Schwarzer & Alan Hirsh, The Modern American Jury: Reflections on Veneration
and Distrust, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 399, 402 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
178. Id. at 402.
179. Devine et al., supra note 140, at 626.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 622.
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that juries are competent decisionmakers.182 “[R]esearchers concur that
jurors on the whole are conscientious, that they collectively understand
and recall the evidence as well as judges, and that they decide factual
issues on the basis of the evidence presented.”183 Moreover, “[s]erious
students of the jury are virtually unanimous in their high regard for the
jury as a decision-maker.”184 Additionally, surveys of judges—arguably
the most significant and consistent jury observers—“show virtually
unanimous support for the institution.”185
Though juries’ ability to rationally resolve disputes has been
criticized, judges and juries frequently agree on the proper trial
outcome.186 According to the Chicago Jury Project, judges and juries
agreed on the appropriate verdict in 78% of the jury trials examined.187
This suggests that juries are not perplexed by complex cases and are
generally able to reach rational results.188 A 1981 study published by the
Federal Judicial Center provided further evidence that juries are able to
adjudicate complex legal issues when it found that “[a]lmost without
exception, respondents who acknowledged the existence of difficult
issues in their jury trials also mentioned explicitly that the jury had made

182. Neil Vidmar, The American Jury System for Ausländer (Foreigners), 13 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 95, 122 (2003).
183. Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1109
(1996).
184. Id.
185. Moses, supra note 141, at 596; see also Hans, supra note 141, at 261–65; Judges’ Opinions
on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and Federal Trial Judges Who Spend at Least Half Their Time
on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L. REV 731, 746–47 (1989) (According to one survey, an
overwhelming majority of judges believe that juries “usually make a serious effort to apply the law as
they are instructed (99% federal, 98% state); [d]o not believe that the feelings jurors have about the
parties often cause them to make inappropriate decisions (80% federal, 69% state). . . . Even in complex
cases involving scientific or highly technical issues, there is a marked reluctance to abandon the jury
system even though there is widespread recognition of the difficulties involved. . . . Majorities of judges
reject the suggestion that there should be a limitation on the use of juries for complex civil cases
involving highly technical and scientific issues (52% federal, 59% state), or for very complicated
business cases (60% federal, 58% state).”).
186. See R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Jury and Negligence: The View from the Bench, 26
GA. L. REV. 85, 101 (1991) (comparing the Chicago Jury Project finding that juries and judges agreed
79% of the time with a Georgia study finding that 71 of the 91 Georgia judges (78%) estimated they
agreed with the jury’s verdict for the plaintiff); see also Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and
Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 743 (2002) (reporting that a one-year
study of forty-five of the nations’ largest counties yielded “no substantial evidence that judges and juries
differ in the rate at which they award punitive damages or in the central relation between the size of
punitive awards and compensatory awards”).
187. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 63 (1966); Harry Kalven, Jr.,
The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1065 (1964) (stating that the Chicago Project studied
jury verdicts in personal injury cases and compared the jury’s decision to what the judge stated he or she
would have found).
188. Kalven, supra note 187, at 1055.

156

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

the correct decision or that the jury had no difficulty applying the legal
standard to the facts.”189 Moreover, contrary to the popular belief that
judges are better able to weed out biased evidence because of their legal
training, the evidence suggests that judges and jurors do not differ in
their reactions to potentially biased information.190
In addition, a number of studies surveying a jury’s handling of
technical or complex issues show that that judges do not fare better in
the face of complexity than jurors.191 One study concluded that “[t]he
jury does by and large understand the facts and get the case straight.”192
In 90% of disagreements between the jury and judge as to the proper
trial outcome, the reason for disagreement was not the jury’s
misunderstanding of the facts.193 In only 1 of the 3,576 cases studied by
the Chicago Jury Project did the judge specifically state that he
disagreed with the jury because of the jury’s inability to understand the
case.194
Furthermore, when a case is factually complex, juries will ask more
questions and take longer to decide the case. According to the Chicago
Jury Project, juries came back with questions in difficult cases about
twice as often as in easy cases.195 Two researchers analyzed deliberation
times from real juries and found that the more complex the case, the
Juries that spend more time
longer the juries deliberated.196

189. GUINTHER, supra note 164, at 213 (emphasis in original).
190. See Moses, supra note 141, at 595; see also Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A
Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil
Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 113, 125 (1994).
191. Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock after Twelve Years, in
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181, 234 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
192. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 187, at 149; Lempert, supra note 191, at 234 (“A close look at
the number of cases, including several in which jury verdicts appear mistaken, does not show juries that
are befuddled by complexity. Even when juries do not fully understand technical issues, they can
usually make enough sense of what is going on to deliberate rationally, and they usually reach
defensible decisions.”).
193. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 187, at 152; Lempert, supra note 191, at 234–35 (“The
empirical evidence also provides no reason to believe that judges will fare better in the face of
complexity than juries . . . judges dealing with unfamiliar, technical information can be as confused as
we fear similarly situated juries are. . . . [I]n complex cases we can expect that some judges will be more
capable than the average jury, and we can expect that the average jury will be more capable than some
judges.”).
194. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 187, at 153; Lempert, supra note 191, at 234 (“To the extent
that juries make identifiable mistakes, their mistakes seem most often attributable not to conditions
uniquely associated with complexity, but to the mistakes of judges and lawyers, to such systematic
deficiencies of the trial process as battles of experts and the prevalence of hard-to-understand jury
instructions, and to the kinds of human error that affect simple trials as well.”).
195. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 187, at 155 (reporting that juries returned with questions 14%
of the time in easy cases and 27% of the time in difficult cases).
196. Thomas L. Brunell et al., Time to Deliberate: Factors Influencing the Duration of Jury
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deliberating also appear less influenced by pretrial media coverage.197
The importance of the right to jury trial for litigants is bolstered by
the relatively low percentage of jury waiver clauses in complex
contracts. A study covering jury waiver clauses in large, commercial,
and complex contracts showed that only 20% of more than 2,800
contracts examined had jury waiver clauses.198 Although other factors
undoubtedly influence parties’ decisions to omit jury waiver clauses in
complex contracts, the absence of such clauses may suggest that some
parties do not want to eliminate the choice as to who decides their
cases.199
Criticisms that juries favor plaintiffs in civil litigation have also been
undermined by the empirical research. The Chicago Jury Project found
that in 12% of civil cases, the jury favors the plaintiff and in 10% of
cases the judge favors the plaintiff.200 As odds would predict, studies
also show that plaintiffs tend to win about 50% of the time in civil
cases.201
2. Empirical Research Regarding Civil Juries’ Damage Awards
Criticisms about juries awarding excessive damages in civil litigation
have also been undermined by empirical research. The research shows
that juries attempt to use a systematic process to determine damage
awards.202
It also demonstrates that compensatory awards are
moderately related to the seriousness of plaintiffs’ injuries and punitive
damage awards are strongly related to the compensatory damages
awarded.203 The typical civil jury award is not extraordinary large,
Deliberation (2nd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, June. 24, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=996426 (including appendix with various data tables in multiple areas); see also
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 187, at 157 (reporting that the average deliberation time was 2.1 hours in
clear and easy cases, it was 3.3 hours in close and easy cases, and it was 4.5 hours in difficult cases).
197. Emily G. Owens, Justice for Hire: Financial Incentives in Jury Deliberation (3d Annual
Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Apr. 14, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120336.
198. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Do Juries Add Value?: Evidence from an
Empirical Study of Jury Trial Waiver Clauses in Large Corporate Contracts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 539, 541 (2007).
199. Moses, supra note 141, at 595.
200. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 187, at 64.
201. Vidmar, supra note 165, at 851; George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of
Disputes for Litigation. 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 55 (1984) (predicting that plaintiff success rates in civil
jury trials should generally fall around 50% and that plaintiffs are not overly favored in civil jury trials);
see also Devine et al., supra note 140, at 702 (stating that almost every major study on the topic has
found that plaintiff success rates vary according to certain factors, particularly case type).
202. Devine et al., supra note 140, at 706.
203. Devine et al., supra note 140, at 702; see also Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and
Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and Suffering,” 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908 (1989); FRANK A. SLOAN ET
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especially considering attorneys’ fees and court costs, and the amount
has not drastically changed over the years when adjusted for inflation.204
The public perception that juries are overly sympathetic to plaintiffs,
regularly award excessive sums of money, and are biased against
defendants with “deep pockets” has likely been “unduly influenced by a
selection bias in the media that focuses attention on atypical high-stakes
cases and their outcomes.”205 It is true, however, that juries tend to
award larger damages against corporate defendants than individual
defendants.206
Neither juries nor judges are perfect dispute resolution mechanisms
because both involve the potential for human error. The empirical
evidence, however, suggests that corporate executives possess either an
irrational fear of juries or at least a fear based on inflated criticisms of
juries.
Civil juries should not be categorically excluded as
decisionmakers on the basis of such criticisms. Moreover, as the next
Part discusses, civil juries fulfill important roles beyond simply
resolving disputes and these roles support giving civil juries a significant
role in shareholder derivative litigation.
IV. THE HISTORICAL AND CONTINUING VALUE OF THE CIVIL JURY
Despite frequent criticism, the jury system is an integral part of the
United States’ justice system. “The jury is almost by definition an
exciting and gallant experiment in the conduct of serious human affairs;
it is not surprising that virtually since its inception it has been embroiled

AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1993); Sentell, supra note 186, at 104 (reporting a Georgia
study that found 71 of the 91 Georgia judges (78%) estimated they agreed with the jury’s verdict for the
plaintiff and that of the judges that did not agree with juries’ awards for plaintiffs, “[a] slight majority of
those judges (14) manifested a definite preference for higher damage awards than their juries were
returning”); see also Eisenberg et al., supra note 186, at 779 (“Juries and judges award punitive damages
at about the same rate, and their punitive awards bear about the same relation to their compensatory
awards. Jury punitive awards have a bit more spread than judge awards, but the effect is not robust and
leads to few jury punitive awards outside the range of what judges are expected to award.”).
204. Devine et al., supra note 140, at 703; see also GUINTHER, supra note 164, at 175 (noting that
the Rand study found that most jury awards did not vary in terms of constant dollars and that, in majorinjury cases, some studies have shown that juries more frequently err on the conservative side); Charles
E. Wyzanski, Jr., A Trial Judge’s Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1287 (1952)
(“[W]hen it comes to a calculation of damages under the flexible rules of tort law the estimate of what
loss the plaintiff suffered can best be made by men who know different standards of working and living
in our society.”).
205. Devine et al., supra note 140, at 702.
206. Id. at 706; see also Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J.
LEGAL STUDIES 623, 640 (1997); Brian J. Ostrom, A Step above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil Jury in
the 1990s, 79 JUDICATURE 233, 238 (1996).
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in controversy . . . .”207 Beginning with early legal journals,
commentators have argued for the abolition of the jury or, at least, for
keeping complex issues away from the jury.208 The jury, however, has
proved an amazingly resilient institution.209 Critics of the civil jury too
often focus on its dispute resolution task, while ignoring the other
important roles fulfilled by the American jury as embodied in the
Seventh Amendment.210
A. The Civil Jury Has a Long History in the United States
The concept of the civil jury stretches back thousands of years. Its
roots trace back 2,500 years to ancient Greece, where juries decided the
outcome of trials and determined penalties.211 Later, the Magna Charta
declared that no man should be condemned without the lawful judgment
of his peers.212 Americans have relied on the civil jury to resolve legal
disputes since the beginning of the colonial period.213
English colonists brought the civil jury system to America.214 The
1641 Massachusetts Body of Liberties specifically provided for civil
juries, and jury trials were available in virtually all civil, as well as
criminal, cases in Virginia as early as 1642.215 Later, during the
American Revolution, the jury’s value was “enhanced because juries
regularly thwarted British objectives and provided a bulwark against
royal tyranny.”216 After the United States gained its independence from
Britain in 1776, every former colony embraced the right to trial by jury

207. Kalven, supra note 187, at 1055–56; see also Landsman, supra note 175, at 37 (noting that
the drafters only mentioned the civil jury twice during the constitutional debates by the delegates and
“[t]hese two brief discussions resulted in the decision to refrain from mentioning the civil jury in the
Constitution’s text, because, the delegates said, ‘the Representatives of the people may be safely trusted
in this matter.’” (quoting Mr. Gorham on September 12, 1787, originally reported in JAMES MADISON,
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, available at http://www.constitution.org/
dfc/dfc_0912.htm)).
208. Oliver P. Shiras, The Jury System, 1 YALE L. J. 45, 47 (1891); Alfred C. Coxe, The Trials of
Jury Trials, 1 COLUM. L. REV. 286, 292 (1901) (“I believe it is a mistake to think that there would be any
general regret were jury trials abolished in the class of civil cases to which I have alluded [civil matters
with complex factual situations].”).
209. Devine et al., supra note 140, at 622.
210. Developments in the Law: The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1419–20 (1997)
[hereinafter The Civil Jury].
211. See id. at 1414–17.
212. Id. at 1418.
213. Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 288
(1999).
214. SWARD, supra note 149, at 90.
215. Landsman, supra note 213, at 285.
216. Id. at 288; see also SWARD, supra note 149, at 90–91.
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and it was probably the only right “universally secured by the first
American state constitutions.”217 In fact, many of the early states
granted a right to jury trial even in equitable actions.218
In drafting the U.S. Constitution, the Federalists and Anti-Federalists
disagreed as to when a right to a jury trial existed.219 However, as
Alexander Hamilton stated:
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in
nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury; or
if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former
regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the
very palladium of free government.220

After much debate, the Federalists and Anti-Federalists compromised
on the right to a jury trial.221 The right to a civil jury trial did not appear
in the Constitution as originally approved by the states in 1788, but it
was incorporated into the Seventh Amendment when the Bill of Rights
was adopted in 1791.222 As previously explained, the Seventh
Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial for all legal claims.223
The history of the civil jury demonstrates that early Americans
believed juries of ordinary people, exempt from corruption, could
resolve society’s disputes.224 Though the civil jury is arguably less
valued than the criminal jury,225 the civil jury continues to play the
important role originally envisioned by the Seventh Amendment.226
And, while the jury has undergone changes, especially in the nineteenth
century,227 it remains a prized institution that plays an important role in
217. Landsman, supra note 213, at 288 (citing LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 281 (1960)).
218. Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil
Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 836–38, 848 (1980).
219. SWARD, supra note 149, at 91–93.
220. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 498 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
221. Wolfram, supra note 75, at 672–73 (“While many of their [anti-Federalists] arguments
concerning the form of the national government and the extent of its powers were ultimately rejected,
the antifederalist arguments concerning civil jury trial (and other guarantees that were enacted into the
Bill of Rights) ultimately prevailed. . . . [T]here is no surviving evidence that the shape of the seventh
amendment enacted by a federalist Congress and approved by federalist state legislatures varied
significantly from what the antifederalists had been arguing for during the ratification process.”).
222. Landsman, supra note 213, at 289.
223. See supra Part II.B.
224. Arnold, supra note 218, at 835.
225. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1412 (noting the Seventh Amendment right to civil jury
has not been applied to the states while the Sixth Amendment right to criminal jury has).
226. Landsman, supra note 213, at 304.
227. See Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170
(1964). Modifications of the civil jury mechanism over the past several decades include relaxing the
unanimity rule and allowing smaller juries. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (upholding a state
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American democracy.228
As the Supreme Court has noted:
“Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance
and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any
seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with
the utmost care.”229
B. The Civil Jury’s Role in American Democracy
The civil jury is not only a dispute resolution mechanism; it is also a
check against the power of judges and legislatures, a legitimator of legal
decisions, and a forum for democracy. Juries are also “equalizers,
capable of bridging the power gap between a big company and an
injured person and thereby reflecting our distinctively American respect
for the individual.”230 The civil jury system, however, does cost jurors
and the judicial system both time and money. Yet, such costs have long
been viewed as outweighed by the values of liberty, democracy, and
political community associated with the civil jury.231
The civil jury is a check against judges.232 In the colonial period,
Americans preferred the decentralized jury trial over a decision by a
single judge, because the judge was viewed as the executive’s agent.233
For this reason, Americans politically opposed courts of equity and

court conviction of a criminal defendant by less than a unanimous jury); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S.
149 (1973) (upholding a civil court verdict of a six-person jury).
228. See The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1436; STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND
ERROR IN THE AMERICAN COURTROOM 215 (1994) (“We are still, through the jury, a government of and
by the ordinary people.”); Landsman, supra note 175, at 54–55 (“History teaches that the jury has been
protean, repeatedly adapting to the needs of changing times. . . . Our loss [of the civil jury] could not be
measured in terms of the jury’s past service alone. We would also be deprived of the adaptations yet to
be fashioned in response to the ever changing needs of society.”).
229. Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959).
230. ADLER, supra note 228, at 215–16.
231. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1413.
232. Orren, supra note 170, at 85; Wolfram, supra note 75, at 653 (stating that one of the purposes
behind the Seventh Amendment is to protect a civil litigant “against an oppressive and corrupt federal
judge”); see also JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, available at
http://www.constitution.org/dfc/dfc_0912.htm (stating that in the 1787 constitutional debates, Mr. Gerry
“urged the necessity of Juries to guard [against] corrupt judges”).
233. See Arnold, supra note 218, at 830, 835; JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY
SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 22–23 (1994) (noting that in early America, the British forced
Americans to be tried in England by British juries in an effort to quash American independence and
democracy); Landsman, supra note 175, at 35 (“From the 1760s until the Revolution, the jury came, in
the colonial mind, to represent the most effective means available to secure the independence and
integrity of the judicial branch of government. It was precisely for this reason that the British authorities
increasingly sought either to control or to avoid jury adjudications. The fight over jury rights was, in
reality, the fight for American independence and served to help unite the colonies.”).
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associated them with exercises of arbitrary power.234 Thus early
Americans valued juries as a check on judges, who could otherwise
exercise their power oppressively, arbitrarily, or corruptly.235 As
Alexander Hamilton argued:
[T]rial by jury must still be a valuable check upon corruption. . . . As
matters now stand, it would be necessary to corrupt both court and jury;
for where the jury have gone evidently wrong, the court will generally
grant a new trial, and it would be in most cases of little use to practise
upon the jury, unless the court could be likewise gained. Here then is a
double security; and it will readily be perceived that this complicated
agency tends to preserve the purity of both institutions. By increasing the
obstacles to success, it discourages attempts to seduce the integrity of
either. The temptations to prostitution which the judges might have to
surmount, must certainly be much fewer, while the [cooperation] of a jury
is necessary, than they might be, if they had themselves the exclusive
determination of all causes.”236

The jury thus fulfills a significant countervailing function against the
judge.
The civil jury is also important as a legitimator of trials. The jury
helps guarantee the integrity of trials because it is more difficult to
corrupt twelve jurors than one judge.237 It also generates public
confidence in its verdicts because it is composed of laypersons and,
therefore, instills a sense of inclusion and participation.238 Furthermore,
that each jury is composed of different individuals helps diffuse
dissatisfaction with verdicts.239 Juries also play a regulating role by
234. Arnold, supra note 218, at 830.
235. Wolfram, supra note 75, at 670–71; see also Arnold, supra note 218, at 834; The Civil Jury,
supra note 210, at 1429 (noting that an important aspect of the jury system is its check on “oppressive
officialdom” or “security against corruption”).
236. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888).
237. Kalven, supra note 187, at 1062; see also ADLER, supra note 228, at 6 (“It seems
wonderfully in keeping with our democratic ideal that we allow juries of ordinary people to have this
power [to give verdicts]. By doing so, we deny powerful judicial officials who may have political
agendas from shaping . . . history for us. . . . It’s no accident that the Communist-era Soviet Union did
without a jury system and, as it fought in 1993 to develop as a democracy, Russia was working to
establish one.”).
238. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1433; see also WILLIAM ORVILLE DOUGLAS, WE THE
JUDGES: STUDIES IN AMERICAN AND INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FROM MARSHALL TO MUKHERJEA
389 (1956) (“A jury reflects the attitudes and mores of the community from which it is drawn. It lives
only for the day and does justice according to its lights . . . it also takes the sharp edges off a law and
uses conscience to ameliorate a hardship. Since it is of and from the community, it gives the law an
acceptance which verdicts of judges could not do.”).
239. See Kalven, supra note 187, at 1062 (stating that the civil jury legitimates legal judgments by
acting as “a lightning rod for animosity and suspicion which might otherwise center on the more
exposed judge”); see also 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, at 19 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981)
(Anti-federalists believed that, “[j]uries are constantly and frequently drawn from the body of the
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establishing a pattern of trial outcomes; the predictability of a trial
outcome is an important factor in settlement negotiations.240 A jury’s
decision not only affects the rights and duties of the parties at bar, but it
also establishes a “pattern of trial outcomes that serves as a backdrop to
private settlement negotiations. Juries thus exert a regulating influence
in the legal system by disseminating information about the probabilities
of trial outcomes.”241 Because the legal system remains connected to
public sentiment through the jury system, the jury is also essential to the
continued popular acceptance of judicial authority.242
The civil jury is also important to American democratic government.
Service on a civil jury is a form of political participation by citizens.243
Before the Constitution was ratified, even the Anti-Federalists
acknowledged the parallel between jury service and the right to vote.244
Alexis de Tocqueville, who wrote the seminal Democracy in America,
found that:

people, and freemen of the country; and by holding the jury’s right to return a general verdict in all cases
sacred, we secure to the people at large, their just and rightful controul of the judicial department.”).
240. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1423; Peter H. Schuck, Mapping the Debate on Jury
Reform, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 306, 307 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) (“[T]he
most significant function of juries is to shape the parties’ predictions about what will happen if the case
goes to trial.”).
241. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1423 (footnote omitted); Schuck, supra note 240, at 307
(Parties use these outcomes to create a “complex screening process that determines the mix of the cases
that are initiated, the pattern of pre-trial settlements, and the mix of the cases that go to trial.”). For
empirical studies on jury decisions and case settlement patterns, see George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein,
The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) and Theodore Eisenberg, Testing
the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337
(1990).
242. Patrick E. Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation of
Judicial Power, 56 TEX. L. REV. 47, 59 (1977).
243. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1437; PATRICK DEVLIN, THE JUDGE 127 (1979) (“In a
democracy, law is made by the will of the people and obedience is given to it not primarily out of fear
but from goodwill. . . . The jury is the means by which the people play a direct part in the application of
the law.”); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. (In re Japanese Elec. Prods.
Antitrust Litig.), 631 F.2d 1069, 1093 (3d Cir. 1980) (Gibbons, J. dissenting) (“In the process of gaining
public acceptance for the imposition of sanctions, the role of the jury is highly significant. The jury is a
sort of ad hoc parliament convened from the citizenry at large to lend respectability and authority to the
process. . . . Any erosion of citizen participation in the sanctioning system is in the long run likely, in my
view, to result in a reduction in the moral authority that supports the process.”); United States v. Levine,
83 F.2d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1986) (Judge Learned Hand commenting that a jury’s verdict is “really a small
bit of legislation ad hoc”).
244. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1437; 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, at 38 (Herbert
J. Storing ed., 1981) (“The trial by jury is—the democratic bench of the judiciary power—more
necessary than representatives in the legislature; for those usurpations, which silently undermine the
spirit of liberty, under the sanction of law, are more dangerous than direct and open legislative attacks;
in the one case the treason is never discovered until liberty, and with it the power of defence is lost; the
other is an open summons to arms, and then if the people will not defend their rights, they do not
deserve to enjoy them.”).

164

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

The system of the jury, as it is understood in America, appears to me to
be as direct and as extreme a consequence of the sovereignty of the
people as universal suffrage. These institutions are two instruments of
equal power, which contribute to the supremacy of the majority. All the
sovereigns who have chosen to govern by their own authority, and to
direct society instead of obeying its directions, have destroyed or
enfeebled the institution of the jury.245

Further, he found juries useful for American democracy: “I think that
the practical intelligence and political good sense of the Americans are
mainly attributable to the long use which they have made of the jury in
civil causes.”246 Political scientists find that the American participatory
model of democracy depends upon high levels of civic activity. Ideally,
as part of their duties and rights, citizens participate in periodic elections
and regularly take part in local community activities such as jury
service.247 Political scientists have argued that citizen involvement in
even minor aspects of public life promotes widespread public
involvement.248 Some researchers have even found that participating on
a jury may increase the likelihood of voting in the future.249
In addition, the civil jury is one of society’s most effective means of
popular education250 and gives those who serve a sense of community
responsibility.251 The jury has an impact on the jurors, because “it
invests each citizen with a kind of magistracy, it makes them all feel the
duties which they are bound to discharge towards society, and the part
which they take in the Government.”252 As Judge Irving Kaufman
245. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 288 (Henry Reeve trans., Colonial
Press rev. ed. 1900) (1835).
246. Id. at 290.
247. John Gastil et al., Civic Awakening in the Jury Room: A Test of the Connection between Jury
Deliberation and Political Participation, 64 J. POLITICS 585, 585 (2002); ABRAMSON, supra note 233,
at 2 (“Elections for president, governor, senator, or other office give power of a sort to the people by
making those who are elected accountable to their constituents through the ballot box. But this is a far
cry from empowering the people themselves with the daily responsibility for governing. . . . By contrast,
the jury version of democracy stands almost alone today in entrusting the people at large with the power
of government . . . .”).
248. Gastil et al., supra note 247, at 586; 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, at 19 (Herbert J.
Storing ed., 1981) (An Anti-federalist writer found that jury trials “are the means by which the people
are let into the knowledge of public affairs—are enabled to stand as the guardians of each others rights,
and to restrain, by regular and legal measures, those who otherwise might infringe upon them.”).
249. Gastil et al., supra note 247, at 592 (“Registered voters who actively participated in criminal
juries that successfully reached verdicts were more likely to vote in future elections than those
empanelled jurors who simply played the role of alternate, had no chance to deliberate, or failed to reach
a verdict after deliberating.”).
250. See The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1408.
251. Dale W. Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 386, 419
(1954).
252. 1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 245, at 289.
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observed, “there can be no universal respect for law unless all
Americans feel that it is their law—that they have a stake in making it
work.”253
The jury system also allows the community to identify with a
governmental process and brings the community’s values into that
process.254 The “civil jury is a democratic institution composed of
laypersons [that] fosters a sense of inclusion and participation that
reflects and generates popular endorsement of the judicial system.”255
The jury thus is intrinsically valuable as a means for society to actively
participate in the administration of government and to keep the legal
system in touch with public sentiment.
Similar to its check against judges, the civil jury also serves as a
check against legislatures’ unjust laws.256 Unlike modern juries, early
juries decided both issues of fact and law, which allowed juries to have
direct control over the substantive law of the community and to protect
Juries in today’s
citizens against a tyrannical government.257
courtrooms, however, do not enjoy this broad power. Now, because
juries primarily render judgments on the facts, their policymaking role
has significantly decreased.258 But even today, the jury can frustrate the
application of unjust laws by refusing to apply such laws.259 Although
253. Judge Irving Kaufman, A Fair Jury—The Essence of Justice, 51 JUDICATURE 88, 91 (1967).
254. Alvin B. Rubin, Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Cases: Voice of Liberty or Verdict by
Confusion? 462 ANNALS AM. ACADEMY POL. & SOC. SCIENCE, Jul. 1982, at 87, 96; see also ADLER,
supra note 228, at 216 (stating that when a jury makes a decision, it reflects community values because
“[t]he people who made that choice sprang from, and then would return to, the community that had to
live with the decision—a satisfying prospect in a nation that takes democracy seriously.”); GUINTHER,
supra note 164, at 174–75 (stating that juries’ verdicts can represent community values; for example,
“jurors—without making a separate punitive damage finding—sometimes add to an award against a
defendant, their purpose to chastise or warn about improper conduct, not to promiscuously pick some
insurance company’s pocket.”).
255. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1433.
256. Orren, supra note 170, at 85; see also ARTHUR D. AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION
CONFRONTS THE JURY SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY 3 (1984) (“In channeling community values into the
legal system, the jury also serves as a check on the possible excesses of the legislative branch.”);
GUINTHER, supra note 164, at xiii (“Jury decisions, at times, have changed the course of history, have
caused laws to be discarded or rewritten, have wrought guarantees of our freedoms.”); id. (“Thomas
Jefferson and others have seen them [juries] as the public’s line of defense against the state when it acts
oppressively, and Jefferson, for that reason, once declared that the right to trial by jury was more
precious to the maintenance of a democracy than even the vote.”).
257. Arnold, supra note 218, at 835; Gary J. Jacobsohn, Citizen Participation in Policy-Making:
The Role of the Jury, 39 J. POLITICS 73, 78 (1977) (noting that, until the first half of the nineteenth
century, the prevailing practice in jury trials was to allow the jury to consider the law and the facts in
carrying out its duty).
258. Jacobsohn, supra note 257, at 78; see also The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1421 (stating
that, once the jury’s power to resolve issues of law disappeared, its value as a forum for deliberative
democracy diminished).
259. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1430; Wolfram, supra note 75, at 705 (“It has been
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this power is restricted by the judge’s power to grant motions such as
directed verdicts, judgments notwithstanding the verdict, and new
trials,260 the secrecy surrounding the jury’s deliberative process gives it
the power to essentially dispense with the operation of law if it sees
fits.261 The jury thus may mitigate otherwise harsh legal rules and create
exceptions to laws.262 The jury also uses community judgment to affect
policy where the law establishes criterion such as a reasonable standard
of care or a reasonable person standard.263 In such cases, juries do not
directly make policy, but implement policy in deciding how to apply the
law to particular cases.264 Juries therefore bring community values into
the judicial process265 and affect policy in terms of “what is actually
being carried out, or enforced, in the real world.”266
V. EXTENDING A JURY TRIAL RIGHT TO SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE
LITIGATION
The civil jury is by no means a perfect institution. The civil jury has
often been criticized by scholars, lawyers, and even judges. Empirical
research, however, undermines much of this criticism and reveals that
the civil jury is not as inept as its critics suggest. In addition, though the
criticisms of the civil jury are directed at its dispute resolution
function—the jury’s ability to competently handle its decisionmaking
tasks, reach rational and unbiased decisions, award fair damages, and
observed, that trial by jury is a safeguard against an oppressive exercise of the power of taxation. This
observation deserves to be canvassed.” (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 563 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.
Cooke ed., 1961)).
260. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1430; see FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1) (stating a judge may
grant judgment as a matter of law once “a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and
the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the
party on that issue”); FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b)(2) & (3) (stating that if the judge denies the motion, the
judge may grant a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law after the jury trial or order a new
trial); FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)(A) (stating a judge may grant a new trial “for any reason for which a new
trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court”).
261. Broeder, supra note 251, at 411.
262. Id.; Bernard D. Meltzer, A Projected Study of the Jury as a Working Institution, 287 ANNALS
AM. ACADEMY POL. & SOC. SCIENCE, May 1953, at 97, 98 (stating that the jury is able to mitigate a
general law it views as too harsh); see also Jacobsohn, supra note 257, at 76.
263. Jacobsohn, supra note 257, at 80; see also Broeder, supra note 251, at 389; Meltzer, supra
note 262, at 98.
264. Jacobsohn, supra note 257, at 76.
265. Higginbotham, supra note 242, at 59–60; see also Arnold, supra note 218, at 833–34 (noting
that juries were historically regarded as instruments of local government); ADLER, supra note 228, at
216 (Juries “apply community values to complex matters of commerce, a democratization of business
rules attempted in few other nations.”).
266. Jacobsohn, supra note 257, at 76 (citing WILLIAM A. WELSH, STUDYING POLITICS 105
(1973)).
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understand complex cases—the civil jury is not merely a dispute
resolution instrument. The civil jury also serves other vital purposes,
including purposes that could significantly benefit shareholder
derivative litigation.
A. Expanding a Right to Jury Trial for all Shareholder Derivative
Litigation
If a normative decision allows jury trials for legal claims in
shareholder derivative litigation in all courts, the next question is how to
implement such a change. The easiest and quickest way would be for
the Supreme Court to hold that the Seventh Amendment applies to the
states.267 Then all states would have to follow Ross v. Bernhard and a
right to a jury trial would exist for legal claims asserted in shareholder
derivative actions. Otherwise, implementing such a change would be
more complicated. For those states that currently do not permit any
right to a jury trial in shareholder derivative litigation, the state
legislatures could enact statutes extending a right to jury trial to legal
claims asserted in shareholder derivative litigation. Alternatively, the
highest court in those states could adopt the reasoning of Ross v.
Bernhard through common law development or possibly an
interpretation of the state constitution. As discussed in the following
subparts, the advantages of expanding the right to jury trial for legal
claims in shareholder derivative actions outweigh the disadvantages.
1. Equality Among Cases
Shareholder derivative lawsuits are no more complicated than other
lawsuits, and therefore courts cannot rationally treat them differently.
Though judges and scholars argue that shareholder derivative actions are
too complex for juries, denying any right to a jury trial in shareholder
derivative actions is inconsistent with the use of juries in other complex
cases. For instance, complicated medical and legal malpractice cases are
entrusted to juries. Similarly, juries resolve complex and highly
technical issues in intellectual property and antitrust cases, as well as in
cases involving engineering, architectural, and construction disputes.
Like shareholder derivative litigation, these cases often involve multiple
parties, vague standards of liability, and complex transactions.
Although these cases present complex issues in areas in which jurors
typically have no specialized knowledge, courts allow the jury to

267. Future work by the author will explore this issue, but to do so in the Article is unnecessary.
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evaluate the evidence and weigh the testimony to determine if a certain
legal standard of conduct was violated. The modern trend demonstrates
that courts increasingly trust jurors, aided by expert testimony when
necessary, to make rational decisions in these complex cases. For
example, physicians traditionally were not liable for malpractice unless
their conduct was not considered customary in the medical field.268 If an
expert gave undisputed testimony that a physician’s actions
corresponded with customary practice, the physician was not liable for
malpractice.269 Today, however, courts permit juries to consider expert
testimony and determine the reasonable standard of care under the
circumstances.270 Thus, this modern trend supports expanding the right
to a jury trial in shareholder derivative actions.
Most importantly, juries are entrusted with resolving actions that are
virtually identical to shareholder derivative litigation.
When a
corporation, rather than its shareholders, litigates a matter, the
corporation is entitled to a jury trial on any legal claims;271 thus the jury
is trusted with the power to hear such claims. The action is derivative
only because the board of directors is disabled in some way from
bringing the claim; if the board is not disabled, the shareholder cannot
pursue a derivative action. It is irrational to deny shareholder derivative
actions equal footing with the same actions pursued directly by
corporations.
Similarly, the Department of Justice, when it criminally prosecutes
corporate wrongdoers, and the SEC, when it brings enforcement
proceedings, have a right to jury trial. Shareholders who file
shareholder derivative litigation based on the same conduct, however,
may not.272 It is nonsensical to argue that a jury can understand the
corporate conduct involved in criminal and enforcement cases, but
cannot comprehend that same conduct in the context of a derivative
action. These cases are no more complicated than shareholder
derivative actions and therefore deserve equal treatment in the right to
jury trial.
Finally, to the extent that the laws commonly implicated in
shareholder derivative actions are too complicated, then the civil jury
also acts as a check on the legal system. As a potential juror, the
268. Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the Jury in Modern Malpractice Law, 87 IOWA L. REV. 909,
913 (2002).
269. Id. at 911–12.
270. Id. at 911–14.
271. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533–34 (1970).
272. An example is the federal criminal prosecution of Enron’s former CEOs, Kenneth Lay and
Jeffrey Skilling, which was followed by shareholder derivative litigation. See Russell Powell, The
Enron Trial Drama: A New Case for Stakeholder Theory, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (2007).
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average citizen must comprehend the law to apply the law (as well as to
obey the law).273 The civil jury thus serves as a constraint on an
increasingly complex legal system274 by influencing legislators to create
laws that are understandable and acceptable to average citizens who
serve as jurors.275 Juries also influence attorneys by requiring them to
understand a case well enough to organize and comprehensibly
communicate it to jurors lacking legal experience.276
2. Minimize Distorting Influences
Extending the right to jury trial in shareholder derivative litigation
also minimizes the incentive for forum shopping presented by the
current legal landscape. For derivative actions filed in federal court, the
Supreme Court in Ross v. Bernhard held “that the right to jury trial
attaches to those issues in derivative actions as to which the corporation,
if it had been suing in its own right, would have been entitled to a
jury.”277 Thus, for shareholder derivative actions filed in federal court
or in state courts that follow Ross v. Bernhard, the shareholders are
entitled to a jury trial on any legal claims asserted. Because most states
have declined to extend any jury trial right to shareholder derivative
actions—based on negative views of civil juries and the historically
equitable nature of such actions—differing jury trial rights can produce a
strong incentive for plaintiffs to forum shop when filing a shareholder
derivative action.
Admittedly, the right to a jury trial is not the only basis on which
plaintiffs forum shop when filing shareholder derivative lawsuits. Most
courts have special pleading standards for shareholder derivative
actions, which require the plaintiffs to plead either that they made a
demand on the board of directors or the reasons such a demand is
excused. This pleading standard is rarely a basis for forum shopping,
however, because it is very common.278 Some forums try to prevent
strike suits and other frivolous lawsuits by restricting which
shareholders may bring derivative actions, such as requiring that the
plaintiff-shareholders represent a specified percentage or dollar

273. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1439.
274. Michael J. Saks, Blaming the Jury, 75 GEO. L.J. 693, 703 (1986); see also The Civil Jury,
supra note 210, at 1437.
275. Jacobsohn, supra note 257, at 81.
276. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1439.
277. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 532–33 (1970).
278. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1.
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investment in the corporation.279 Such filing restrictions may lead
shareholder-plaintiffs to choose an alternative forum.
“There is nothing inherently evil about forum-shopping”280 and all
lawsuits likely involve some degree of forum shopping.281 Forum
shopping is not one act or course of conduct, but rather encompasses
various factors and choices.282 Forum shopping “is only a pejorative
way of saying that, if you offer a plaintiff a choice of jurisdictions, he
will naturally choose the one which he thinks his case can be most
favourably presented: this should be a matter neither for surprise nor for
indignation.”283 Nevertheless, different rules governing the right to a
jury trial in shareholder derivative litigation present some negative
consequences.
Procedure is a powerful litigation tool, and procedural differences can
impact forum selection. As Representative John Dingell stated: “I’ll let
you write the substance . . . and you let me write the procedure, and I’ll
screw you every time.”284 Procedural differences can lead to differences
in the ultimate outcome of the case.285 These incentives distort
279. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-107-402(3) (2009) (allowing a court to compel a shareholder
who owns less than a prescribed amount of stock to post a bond); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 627
(McKinney 2003) (same); 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1835 n.1 (3d ed. 2007) (listing Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin as states adopting bond requirements). Delaware also requires:
an affidavit stating that the [plaintiff] has not received, been promised or offered and will
not accept any form of compensation, directly or indirectly, for prosecuting or serving as
a representative party in the derivative action in which the person or entity is a named
part except (i) such fees, costs or other payments as the Court expressly approves to be
paid to or on behalf of such person, or (ii) reimbursement, paid by such person’s
attorneys, of actual and reasonable out-of-pocket expenditures incurred directly in
connection with the prosecution of the action.
DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(b).
280. Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 512 n.12 (4th Cir. 1987).
281. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 143, at 121; Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping,
Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 555 (1989); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore
Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1508 n.1 (1995) (calling
forum shopping a “national legal pastime”).
282. Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 345–46 (2006). There are “five
basic, and overlapping, types of decisionmaking considerations inherent in forum selection: (1) choices
involving federal courts versus state courts; (2) choices involving courts in different states; (3) choices
involving different substantive laws; (4) choices involving different procedural provisions; and (5)
choices involving subjective and personal factors.” Id.
283. Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553,
571 (1989).
284. Regulatory Reform Act, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental
Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 312 (1983) (statement of Rep. John Dingell,
Chairman, H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce).
285. Kimberly A. Morre & Francesco Parisi, Rethinking Forum Shopping in Cyberspace, 77 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1325, 1331 (2002).
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shareholder derivative litigation, and may lead to such actions being
filed in states which are unfamiliar with the substantive law applied to
the merits of the challenged directors’ decisions. At a minimum,
inequality in the treatment of shareholders results when similar
derivative actions possess differing rights to jury trial based solely on
the courts in which such actions are filed.
Different rules for the right to a jury trial also incentivize plaintiffshareholders to creatively plead their cases. For instance, when a
plaintiff cannot file a shareholder derivative action in a court that would
permit a jury trial, that plaintiff has an incentive to creatively plead that
their claims are not derivative but rather direct, which will provide the
right to jury trial of any legal issues. In a shareholder derivative lawsuit,
the injury was to the corporation and thus the cause of action and any
recovery belongs to the corporation. By contrast, in a direct shareholder
lawsuit, the injury is to the shareholder and the recovery belongs to the
shareholder. For example, if the corporation breaches a contractual right
of one class of shareholders, those shareholders have a direct cause of
action. By creatively pleading their case as a direct shareholder action, a
right to a jury trial exists for those claims even though the state would
deny a right to a jury trial if it were a derivative suit. Nevertheless, there
is no difference between direct and derivative action trials.
3. Avoid Excessive Deference to Directors and Officers
Entrusting enforcement to civil juries in shareholder derivative
actions is also wise based on judges’ past performance. Accepting the
argument advanced by judges and scholars that civil juries are incapable
of resolving complex business cases is troubling. Judges have
historically shown great deference to the decisions of corporate
executives on the rationale that “judges are not business experts.”286
Scholars also believe that “courts are ill-equipped to review business
decisions” because they “often involve intangibles, intuitive insights or
surmises as to business matters such as competitive outlook, cost
structure, and economic and industry trends” and are “not susceptible to
systematic analysis.”287 Yet, the judiciary has not created a “medical
judgment rule” or a “design judgment rule” that precludes judicial

286. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); see also Douglas M.
Branson, The Rule that Isn’t a Rule—The Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 637 (2002)
(stating “courts are ill-equipped to review business decisions” because they “often involve intangibles,
intuitive insights or surmises as to business matters such as competitive outlook, cost structure, and
economic and industry trends” and are “not susceptible to systematic analysis”).
287. Branson, supra note 286, at 637.
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review in medical malpractice or product liability cases.288 No other
profession or issue is deemed too complicated for judges to review.289
As noted in Part II, the business judgment rule defense operates as a
presumption that directors have acted consistent with their fiduciary
duties in making corporate decisions.290 This presumption alone
demonstrates judicial deference to defendants in derivative litigation.
Further, because defendants can assert the business judgment rule
defense in motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, and
motions for directed verdicts at trial, defendants have continuous
opportunities to argue essentially the same defense to the judge.291
Consequently, the judge possesses a great deal of power to end
shareholder derivative litigation in favor of defendants and may be more
likely to do so after repeated argument. Judges’ deference to directors is
well documented by the vast number of cases in which judges have
protected directors from legal liability based on the business judgment
rule defense.292 For instance, the Delaware Chancery Court, which sits
without juries, rarely imposes liability on corporate executives for
breaching their fiduciary duties. That perhaps explains why many
Fortune 500 companies choose to incorporate in Delaware.293 Because
judges give inordinate deference to directors’ decisions compared to the
deference accorded other defendants, civil juries can act as a
counterbalance to judges at least in those shareholder derivative actions
that reach trial.294 Empowering the jury to decide whether directors
288. See Bainbridge, supra note 11, at 120 (noting that “no ‘medical judgment’ or ‘design
judgment’ rule precludes judicial review of malpractice or product liability cases”).
289. See id.; see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 94 (1991) (asking why “the same judges who decide whether
engineers have designed the compressors on jet engines properly . . . cannot decide whether a manager
negligently failed to sack a subordinate who made improvident loans”); Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A.
Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L.
REV. 587, 613–17 (1994) (discussing the differences between courts’ review of business and medical
decisions); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, the Business Judgment Rule, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 573, 581
(opining that “judges should find it far easier to overcome the barrier of expertise and stand in the shoes
of outside directors than in those of almost any of the other professionals whose actions courts are
routinely called upon to review”).
290. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del.
2006); McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916–17 (Del. 2000).
291. See supra Part II.
292. See Fairfax, supra note 17, at 409 (“[T]he tremendous deference courts grant to board
decisions means that courts hold directors liable for only the most egregious examples of director
misconduct.”); see also TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A
CROSSROAD 183–84 (2006) (noting “the historical strong protection of corporate boards”).
293. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA COMMISSION ON BUSINESS LAWS AND
THE ECONOMY, JANUARY 1995, at 8 (“The Delaware Chancery Court is one reason many Fortune 500
companies choose to incorporate in that state.”).
294. See supra Part III.B.
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have breached their fiduciary duties is a better mechanism for providing
just resolution of shareholder derivative actions.
4. Superior Group Decisionmaking
Twelve jurors participating in open-minded discussions will reach
better results than one judge acting alone.295 “The distinctive strength
and safeguard of the jury system is that the jury operates as a group” and
“twelve lay heads are very probably better than one.”296
Judges cannot test their unconscious mental and emotional prejudices
against the reactions of others, as can members of a jury while
deliberating.297 As such, a jury may prove more impartial than the judge
in relation to a particular case being tried. The American justice system
relies on an adversarial form of justice, in which adversaries present
proof in a highly structured setting and then the decisionmaker renders a
decision.298 “The jury is the most neutral and passive decisionmaker
available . . .” because, unlike a judge, it does not rule on any pretrial
motions and is not involved in the lawsuit’s administration.299 Also
unlike a judge, the jury does not hear pretrial disputes and only
considers evidence deemed not greatly prejudicial according to the rules
of evidence.300 The jury will also not have certain prejudices that judges
may develop towards certain types of claims, parties, or lawyers.301
Moreover, a group with a variety of perspectives represents the
community in the legal decisionmaking process and lessens the
possibility that one individual’s idiosyncratic views will control the
outcome. The individuals comprising a jury possess diverse views and
their role on the jury brings them together to deliberate until they reach a
desirable communal solution to both moral and social issues.302
Although individual jurors likely have prejudices, the combination of
individual jurors is intended to represent the community.303 In a
democracy, this is the ideal means of addressing dissension and conflict:
[L]ong ago, Aristotle suggested that democracy’s chief virtue was the
way it permitted ordinary persons drawn from different walks of life to
achieve a “collective wisdom” that none could achieve alone. At its best,
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

See Broeder, supra note 251, at 388.
Kalven, supra note 187, at 1067.
Meltzer, supra note 262, at 98.
Landsman, supra note 213, at 288.
Id.
Id.
Id.
The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1441.
Orren, supra note 170, at 97.
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the jury is the last, best refuge of this connection among democracy,
deliberation, and the achievement of wisdom by ordinary persons.304

Therefore, the jury is the best judicial and political institution to try
cases and resolve society’s issues.305
Civil juries’ ability to bring community values to the judicial process
and keep the judicial system in touch with public sentiment is vital today
when shareholders have ample reason to distrust corporate executives,
judges, and the government generally. Through their verdicts, civil
juries can instill meaning into the laws governing directors’ fiduciary
duties.
5. Undesirability of Specialized Knowledge
Judges are not inherently more qualified than jurors to make factual
conclusions on complicated issues. Judges have legal backgrounds, but
this does not give them specialized knowledge of complex areas such as
the inner workings of a corporation, medicine, or computer
technology.306 A judge likely has no more training in such areas than
the average juror.307 In fact, in a group of twelve jurors it is likely that
one or more jurors will possess worldly experiences touching on a
question similar to the one in dispute.308
Likely the biggest objection to expanding the right to jury trial to
shareholder derivative actions is the development of business courts
during the past decade.309 As of 2008, some form of business court
existed in twelve states as well as in several cities.310 “The phrase
‘business courts’ is used as a generic term for the variety of courts and
programs that have been created which are not separate courts at all, but
divisions or programs within an existing court.”311 Some commentators
consider the Delaware Court of Chancery the “most well known of the

304. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1441 n.145.
305. See id. at 1441; Meltzer, supra note 262, at 98.
306. See Fabrikant v. Bache & Co. (In re U.S. Fin. Securities Litig.), 609 F.2d 411, 431 (9th Cir.
1979).
307. Id.
308. Broeder, supra note 251, at 388. But see Paul F. Kirgis, The Problem of the Expert Juror, 75
TEMP. L. REV. 493, 497 (2002) (arguing juror with specialized background knowledge that overlaps with
the case’s central issue should be subject to a strike for cause to avoid potential bias).
309. Mitchell L. Bach & Lee Applebaum, A History of the Creation and Jurisdiction of Business
Courts in the Last Decade, 60 BUS. LAW. 147, 151 n.1 (2004).
310. Lee Applebaum, The “New” Business Courts: Responding to Modern Business and
Commercial Disputes, 17 BUS. LAW TODAY, Mar./Apr. 2008, at 13, 14 (also noting that Colorado,
Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Oklahoma are considering business courts).
311. Bach & Applebaum, supra note 309, at 151 n.1.

2009]

SHAREHOLDERS IN THE JURY BOX

175

courts that are considered business courts.”312 The Delaware Chancery
Court, however, is actually a traditional court of equity separate from the
Delaware common law courts.313
Some states have created business courts to attract businesses,314 but
the more typical justification is efficiency.315 Business courts often have
expedited schedules that enable businesses to quickly resolve
differences,316 and their dockets are generally separate from general
litigation and criminal dockets that can slow resolution of business
cases.317 The Delaware Chancery Court in particular has been praised
for its ability to provide quick and effective action and for its refined
body of law that provides businesses predictability.318 Contrarily, some
supporters argue that business courts may benefit the justice system by
improving case flow for other litigation areas319 because “business cases
are known to move at a glacial pace, making it difficult for the
businesses involved, and tying up the court system for other
litigants.”320 Supporters also believe that “general courts are ill312. See id. at 216; Applebaum, supra note 310, at 13 (calling the Delaware Court of Chancery
the “bright star” within specialized business courts).
313. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 341, 342 (2009).
314. Kimberly A. Ward, Getting Down to Business—Pennsylvania Must Create a Business Court,
or Face the Consequences, 18 J.L. & COM. 415, 415, 421 (1999) (finding that Pennsylvania’s business
community and state government view business courts as an economic tool); Chad Kile, Oklahoma
Lawmaker Proposes Specialized Businesses Court, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 4, 2003 (“If Oklahoma
could get on the leading edge of this business court, we would look progressive—pro business.”); Jill
Krueger, Roche Takes Reins of First Business Court, ORLANDO BUS. J., Oct. 31, 2003 (stating that the
business court “represents an . . . opportunity for Orlando, and Florida for that matter, to demonstrate its
commitment to achieving an efficient and meaningful resolution of business disputes.”).
315. Sheri Qualters, Verdict: Business Court Has Made Strong Case for Itself, BOSTON BUSINESS
J., Aug. 2, 2002 (“Arguing before judges well-versed in business matters also speeds the process.”).
316. Id.
317. See Sally Apgar, Proponents Say Separate Business Court Needed, STAR TRIB., Nov. 7,
1990, at 1D. (“Both state and federal courts are so inundated with criminal cases that carry the right to a
speedy trial, that business litigation gets put on a back burner.”); Dan Crawford, Ohio Bar Considers
Push for Separate Business Court, BUS. FIRST OF COLUMBUS, Jan. 3, 1997 (stating that business cases
“are being held hostage to the criminal docket”); see also Ember Reichgott Junge, Business Courts:
Efficient Justice or Two-Tiered Elitism?, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 315, 318 (1998) (arguing that the
speed of business courts purportedly will aid “small and mid-size businesses which do not have
resources to hire private . . . arbitrators” and “suffer most from the high costs and long delays of civil
litigation”); National Center for State Courts, Complex Litigation: Key Findings from the California
Pilot Program, 3 CIVIL ACTION, Winter 2004, at 2 (reporting an empirical study based on the California
pilot program for complex civil litigation showed that caseloads “were sufficiently reduced to give
judges the relative luxury to engage in substantial supervision” and the cases moved faster through
litigation than non-pilot program cases).
318. William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the Delaware Court of Chancery in the StateFederal Joint Venture of Providing Justice, 48 BUS. LAW. 351 (1992).
319. Applebaum, supra note 310, at 17.
320. Junge, supra note 317, at 316–17 (also arguing that business courts would allow business
cases to be resolved more quickly, free up resources for other cases, and decrease costs overall); see also

176

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

equipped to efficiently resolve sophisticated commercial disputes”321
and theorize that “a judge who is consistently hearing a limited—though
not small—universe of case types will develop a greater knowledge and
expertise in both the subject matter of these cases and in their procedural
management.”322 In addition, business courts were partly created
because business litigants and litigators wanted to avoid state trial courts
in which multiple judges sometimes handled different aspects of the
same case, leading to an allegedly “unpredictable, uninformed, and
unreliable process.”323
These justifications for business courts, however, are not entirely
incompatible with jury trials. A judge in a business court could oversee
the entire pretrial process in a given case, but a civil jury could still
serve as the factfinder at trial. More importantly, business courts create
other systemic problems. Judicial specialization creates “risks of
myopia, lack of cross-pollinating ideas from learning other fields of the
law, having the same judge hearing all cases in the same subjects for too
long, and so on.”324 In addition, such business courts “may function
with a bias toward commercial parties as opposed to individual
nonbusiness litigants involved in commercial litigation.”325 Even the
state’s involvement in creating business courts may create bias, because
“[a] court whose very function is to facilitate the state’s commercial
enterprise could easily develop a bias in favor of commercial parties or a
bias against non-business litigants involved in commercial litigation.”326
Similarly, states’ creation of business courts to benefit or attract
businesses may harm consumers and individual litigants.327
Notably, the vast majority of states have not rushed to create business
courts. “After years of study and analysis, California decided against
Applebaum, supra note 310, at 17 (arguing that business courts “may become laboratories for
innovations that can be used systemwide”).
321. Junge, supra note 317, at 315.
322. Applebaum, supra note 310, at 16 (“This will permit these specialist judges to make more
reliable and informed decisions, and to do so with greater efficiency.”); Bach & Applebaum, supra note
309, at 228 (“Judges presented daily with a field of law in which to cultivate their understanding,
knowledge, and ability are more likely to come to deeper understandings about the inner workings of the
legal principles they face; the patterns that may reveal themselves in the conduct of business cases; and
the patterns of thinking and behavior that may appear in parties and counsel.”).
323. Applebaum, supra note 310, at 14.
324. Id. at 16.
325. Junge, supra note 317, at 318.
326. Adam Feit, Tort Reform, One State at a Time: Recent Developments in Class Actions and
Complex Litigation in New York, Illinois, Texas, and Florida, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 899, 913 (2008)
(“The justice rendered by business courts has the potential to become questionable when these business
courts decide claims brought against businesses by individuals, as they are increasingly doing in some
states.”).
327. Id.
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the creation of business courts.”328 The chair of California’s task force
that studied such courts, Justice Richard Aldrich, stated that “the only
place we found support [for business courts] was within the business
community.”329 Perhaps one reason states are leery of business courts is
their detrimental effect on the judicial system as a whole.330 “A
specialized business court runs contrary to the goal of court unification
and simplification.”331 Critics further worry about “a proliferation of
courts where every interest has a court”332 and triggering more litigation
with the streamlined process offered by business courts.333 Opponents
also question how proposed business courts would be funded334 and the
potentially limited number of cases that such courts would handle.335
Additionally, business courts could lead to “turf battles between regular
trial division courts—many of whose judges feel capable of dealing with
complex business disputes—and the specially created business
courts.”336 Finally, business courts are unnecessary because judges
“already ha[ve] the inherent power to use special case management
techniques to address the goals of the business court.”337
B. Improving and Checking Civil Juries’ Performance
Expanding the right to a jury trial in shareholder derivative actions is
unlikely to flood the judicial system with substantially more jury trials.
Although statistics are not available for derivative and direct shareholder
actions ending in jury verdicts, only about 1% of cases in the state court
systems and 2% in the federal system end with a verdict by a civil
328. Id.
329. Id. at 914; see also Qualters, supra note 315 (reporting that a survey of the Suffolk Superior
Court found 52% of attorneys were “extremely satisfied” with the court’s overall performance, 70%
were extremely satisfied with the promptness of the court’s decisions, and 58% were extremely satisfied
with the firmness of the schedule).
330. See Junge, supra note 317, at 318.
331. Id.
332. Crawford, supra note 317.
333. Id.
334. Id.; Sheri Qualters, Business Court to Expand to Other Counties, BOSTON BUSINESS J., Feb.
14, 2003 (noting that “business-session litigants have had to hire their own court reporters at various
times during the past couple of years” at the business-session of Suffolk Superior Court based in
Boston).
335. See Todd Bishop, Business Court Looking for a Bit More Business, PHILADELPHIA BUS. J.,
May 19, 2000; Press Millen, Why Do We Have a Business Court? at VI-B-7,
http://www.wcsr.com/resources/pdfs/bl051208.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2010) (noting that the North
Carolina business court has more technology available to it than other courts and its judges receive law
clerks unlike other judges).
336. Millen, supra note 335, at VI-B-6.
337. Junge, supra note 317, at 318.
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jury.338 Moreover, of the more than 150,000 jury trials that take place
each year in the United States, most involve torts such as automobile
accidents and premises liability.339
Improving and monitoring the performance of civil juries may
alleviate any lingering concerns about expanding the right to jury trial in
shareholder derivative actions. The opportunity to determine the
“correct” verdict in actual jury trials is rare,340 so it is instead more
useful to focus on procedural criteria that theoretically relate to the
accuracy of jury verdicts including: (1) jurors’ thorough review of the
facts in evidence, (2) jurors’ accurate comprehension of the judge’s
instructions, (3) all jurors’ active participation, (4) resolution of
differences through discussion by jurors rather than pressuring tactics,
and (5) systematic matching of case facts to the requirements for the
various verdict options.341
Published empirical research on jury decisionmaking identifies very
similar factors as positively and consistently influencing juries’
decisions. The research includes factors such as: definitions of key legal
terms, verdict options, trial structure, jury–defendant demographic
similarity, jury attitude composition, evidence strength, pretrial
publicity, inadmissible evidence, case type, and the initial distribution of
juror verdict preferences during deliberations.342
For example, in an extensive study of jurors in post-deliberation
interviews from 225 trials, researchers found that the verdict preferred
by the majority of jurors on the first ballot was the jury’s final verdict
more than 90% of the time.343 The empirical data on non-unanimous
juries suggest that they do not function as well as their unanimous
counterparts and that non-unanimous rule juries virtually always cease
serious deliberations once they have reached the majority required for a
decision.344 Further, the smaller the required majority, the faster the

338. See Landsman, supra note 213, at 289; see also Bureau of Justice Statistics, General Civil
(Tort, Contract, and Real Property) Trials, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=2231 (last
visited Jan. 16, 2010) (stating that of the 98,786 tort cases that were terminated in U.S. district courts
during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, 1,647 or 2% were decided by a bench or jury trial).
339. Devine et al., supra note 140, at 622; see also Ostrom, supra note 206, at 233–41 (stating that
about 75% of the cases that go to civil juries are tort cases, and about two thirds of those involve
automobile accidents or premises liability).
340. Devine et al., supra note 140, at 707.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 622.
343. Id. at 623; see Marla Sandys & Ronald C. Dillehay, First-Ballot Votes: Predeliberation
Dispositions, and Final Verdicts in Jury Trials, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 175, 175–95 (1995) (indicating
that one in ten trials results in a reversal of the verdict preference initially favored by the majority).
344. See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983).
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jury’s deliberations.345 For example, juries that needed only to reach an
eight-to-four verdict in a particular mock case deliberated 75 minutes on
average, the ten-to-two juries took 103 minutes, and their unanimous
jury counterparts needed 138 minutes. Majority rule juries felt
significantly less certain about the correctness of their decisions and the
winning majority tended to “adopt a more forceful, bullying, persuasive
style” of deliberating.346 The judicial system thus should require that
civil juries in shareholder derivative actions reach unanimous verdicts.
Further, research indicates that increased juror pay increases deliberation
time,347 so jurors should receive higher pay to facilitate longer
deliberation time and potentially improve trial outcomes.
Importantly, juries are not completely unrestrained in rendering
verdicts. Trial and appellate courts operate as a “final check” upon
juries’ deliberations and verdicts. Trial courts are generally required to
respect jury decisions, as juries are afforded broad latitude in assessing
In limited
witness credibility and weight of the evidence.348
circumstances, however, if juries reach the “wrong” decision, a trial
judge may order a new trial. For example, a trial judge may order a new
trial if the judge believes errors occurred during the trial, such as
erroneous jury instructions or erroneous admission of evidence.349 A
trial judge also may order a new trial if the jury’s verdict is against the
clear weight of the evidence (sometimes phrased as a manifestly unjust
verdict), but not simply because the judge disagrees with the verdict.350
The reviewing judge also has several other options in response to a
perceived incorrect verdict.
A judge may grant judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (now called judgment as a matter of law in
federal courts), which grants judgment to the losing party upon a
showing that it is the only rational result.351 Alternatively, the judge
may require the plaintiff to choose between accepting a remittitur, which
is a lower amount of damages than awarded by the jury, and a new

345. Id. at 60, 95.
346. Id. at 112.
347. Owens, supra note 197 (proposing jurors receive about fifty dollars per day based on a 2001
study of the 1990 Offender Based Transaction Statistics).
348. Landsman, supra note 213, at 304.
349. See, e.g., Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 87–88 (3d Cir. 1960).
350. See id.
351. See, e.g., Pa. R.R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333, 395 (1933); FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a) (“If a
party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would
not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may: (A)
resolve the issue against the party; and (B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the
party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a
favorable finding on that issue.”).

180

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

trial.352 In some states, a judge may even require the defendant to
choose between additur, a judge-ordered increase in the amount of
damages awarded, and a new trial.353 Similarly, the appellate courts
possess limited authority to review jury verdicts.
VI. CONCLUSION
The corporate conduct exposed in the recent financial collapse
demonstrated the failure of prior legislative and regulatory responses
intended to prevent future corporate governance crises. Legislation
alone will not end the greed of corporate directors and officers, nor will
it force corporate executives to properly oversee corporate activity.
Enforcement is crucial. The SEC sometimes prosecutes enforcement
proceedings under the federal securities laws and the Department of
Justice occasionally initiates criminal charges under those laws. But
breaches of fiduciary duties are left for shareholders to pursue through
derivative actions. Unfortunately, most states assign the adjudication of
such actions to judges, who have historically accorded great deference to
corporate directors and officers. For instance, the Delaware Chancery
Court, which sits without juries, rarely imposes liability on corporate
executives for breaching their fiduciary duties. Thus, judges may not be
the best enforcers of the legal obligations imposed on corporate directors
and officers.
To prevent the next crisis in corporate governance, the answer is not
to enact more laws, but rather to change the enforcer of the existing
laws. Such an enforcer already exists—the civil jury. Civil juries are
widely utilized in complex cases touching other areas of the law. They
are already entrusted to decide virtually identical legal claims pursued
by the corporation itself and shareholder derivative actions filed in
federal court, without any apparent negative consequences. Civil juries
are composed of average American citizens who can exercise the
oversight currently lacking. Corporate executives’ incentives to act in
the best interests of shareholders and to fulfill their fiduciary duties are
increased by the knowledge that jurors similar to their shareholders will
judge their conduct.
This simple change may produce better
decisionmaking by corporate executives and may restore shareholders’
trust in corporate management.
352. See Hetzel v. Prince William County, 523 U.S. 208, 211 (1998) (authorizing remittitur); see
also Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 649 (1977) (limiting plaintiff to choosing between
accepting the remittitur and facing a new trial).
353. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 483 (1935) (stating that additur violates the Seventh
Amendment); Jehl v. S. Pac. Co., 427 P.2d 988, 992–93 (Cal. 1967) (permitting additur).
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Opponents of this proposal will likely recite the typical criticisms of
civil juries’ performance in resolving disputes, but empirical research
undermines the force of those criticisms. Moreover, important historical
and policy arguments favor the use of jury trials in civil litigation, and
those arguments are particularly relevant for shareholder derivative
litigation. Corporate executives will undoubtedly argue that juries judge
them more harshly than individual judges, but that is precisely the point.
Because judges have traditionally deferred to the decisions of corporate
executives, judges are perceived as judging corporate executives too
leniently and thus are not the ideal decisionmakers in shareholder
derivative litigation—especially in light of recent corporate governance
failures. At the same time, for juries to effectively operate as the
enforcer, the judicial system must restrain judges from improperly using
pretrial motions to keep cases from reaching trial. To the extent
corporate executives continue to irrationally fear juries, they can always
settle asserted claims. An incentive to settle exists in all civil litigation
and settlement has long been encouraged by the American judicial
system.
The civil jury plays an important populist role in our democracy.
Civil juries give a voice to the public when directors and officers, and
even judges, are out of touch with fiduciary duties and the interests of
shareholders. States that deny any right to jury trial in shareholder
derivative actions, such as Delaware, are anti-populist and widen the
chasm between management and shareholders. Extending a jury trial
right to shareholder derivative actions filed in all courts, would
reinvigorate shareholder derivative litigation by trusting civil juries to
decide whether directors and officers have breached their fiduciary
duties. In light of continuing egregious conduct by corporate directors
and officers, empowering civil juries would fill the existing void in
corporate oversight and help restore the public’s trust in corporate
management and the stock markets.

